Wider Europe

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two major issues: the chances of the EU suspending visa liberalization for Georgia and the next EU budget.

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Wider Europe Briefing: EU Preps Suspension Of Georgia Visa Liberalization And What's In The Bloc's New Budget Proposal?

by RFE/RL

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Briefing #1: Will The EU Really Suspend Visa Liberalization For Georgia?

What You Need To Know: European Union foreign ministers failed to take any meaningful decision on Georgia at their July 15 meeting in Brussels.

However, the European Commission did send a letter to Tbilisi warning that Georgians' visa-free travel privileges could be suspended if a number of conditions aren’t met by the end of August.

The question now is how serious this deadline really is, whether the Georgian government will budge, and ultimately whether Brussels can actually muster the will to act if Tbilisi doesn’t change course.

One thing was clear from the start.

Sanctions, even the latest proposal of slapping asset freezes and visa bans on two Georgian judges, were off the table.

Both Hungary and Slovakia had made it clear in preparatory meetings that they would not approve.

According to EU diplomats familiar with the discussions, the issue was briefly touched upon, but since unanimity is needed and clearly wasn’t attainable, it was agreed that sanctions work will continue at lower levels in Brussels.

This is a clear indication that restrictive measures of this sort won’t happen anytime soon.

And with the same ministers at the same meeting failing to adopt sanctions on Israeli West Bank settlers and Russian officials, it is increasingly obvious that the EU consensus rule is once again preventing the bloc from taking concrete foreign policy decisions.

Deep Background: Surprisingly, there was also no push to start a review of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement, which could lead to the suspension of certain provisions -- particularly those related to trade.

The question is how much of an effect this would have, as EU imports from Georgia under the agreement's free trade component are only worth around 200 million euros ($233 million).

Some EU member states did bring it up, and there is a real possibility that the ministers will return to it when they formally meet again in October.

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas concluded that the option of triggering a review is very much on the table, especially since this move doesn’t require unanimity.

That leaves the suspension of visa liberalization as the remaining option to put pressure on Tbilisi -- a move that would require a qualified majority to trigger.

While RFE/RL understands that such a majority is emerging, it’s not universally popular among member states and it was made clear that it should be used as a very last resort.

Around eight member states, led by Italy, argued against it, saying it would hit the Georgian population at large and therefore would be disproportionate.

Kallas urged countries to be ready to react in case Tbilisi hasn’t complied with eight visa-free regime benchmarks that the European Commission put forward in a report back in December 2024.

These benchmarks include repealing the controversial "transparency of foreign influence" law and the equally contested legislative package on "family values and protection of minors."

Brussels also wants Georgia to align its visa policy with the EU list of visa-required third countries.

Drilling Down

• Now the question is whether the EU will really do something and what the deadline really is. The European Commission did send a letter to Georgia on July 15 noting that “in case of persisting non-compliance the Commission could take appropriate measures on the basis of Article 8 of the revised Visa Regulation, specifically activating the visa suspension mechanism.”
• Various Georgian media outlets circulated an early version of the letter, which didn’t include a specific deadline. It simply asked Georgian authorities "to update the Commission on the implementation of these recommendations and, if not already done, to take appropriate measures to address the issues raised in all Commission recommendations (in annex).”
• Interestingly, this was not the final version of the letter, which was identical to the draft apart from a revision of the above-mentioned paragraph. The final version, seen by RFE/RL, stated that “we would like to ask you to update the Commission on the implementation of these recommendations by the end of August and, if not already done, to take appropriate measures to address the issues raised in all Commission recommendations (in annex).”
• So, the end of August it is -- a date Kaja Kallas also mentioned in the press conference after the foreign affairs meeting.
• The question is how firm that deadline really is. The Georgian parliament is in recess for all of August. While the president can recall the chamber for emergency sessions to pass crucial legislation, few in Brussels believe this will happen.
• But the bloc is also “on holiday” for most of August. EU foreign ministers will come together for an informal meeting in Denmark on August 29-30 and again on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York in September, but their first formal meeting at which any concrete decision can be made will take place on October 20.
• It seems member states would be more comfortable waiting for the European Commission’s next visa suspension mechanism report due later in the autumn or even the annual enlargement reports, which the Commission plans to publish later this year, assessing the progress of all EU candidate countries. As the ministerial meeting showed, Brussels tends to kick the can whenever consensus is lacking.

Briefing #2: Proposed EU Budget: What's In It For New Members?

What You Need To Know: The European Commission has put forward its vision for the next long-term (2028-2034) European Union budget -- a record-high 2-trillion-euro ($2.3 trillion) framework, with a doubling of funds for both Ukraine and EU foreign policy in general, and a fivefold increase in defense-related investment.

It is worth remembering that the July 16 proposal is just the opening shot in a battle that will consume Brussels for the next two years.

All 27 EU member states, which provide the vast majority of the cash through national contributions linked to their gross national income (GNI), must approve the proposal.

But this is not likely to happen until what is expected to be marathon, last-minute negotiations in the latter half of 2027.

So don’t count on the budget remaining at 2 trillion euros by then -- or on Ukraine, foreign policy, and enlargement policy getting as much financial support as the European Commission presented on July 16.

Most of the net contributors -- in other words, those who pay more into the common budget than they receive back -- are mainly richer northern member states such as Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden, and they aren’t keen to increase the budget at all.

Deep Background: The commission proposal is already a 600-billion-euro ($700 billion) jump compared to the 2021-2027 budget.

And with several countries grappling with low growth, ballooning deficits, and budget cuts, the idea of the EU expanding its coffers right now could be useful ammunition for Euroskeptic parties railing against Brussels across the continent.

To appease member states on this, the European Commission is proposing two things.

First, new “own resources” so that the budget isn’t so dependent on member state contributions. Some of the new ideas include a tobacco tax and levies on large corporations.

Few think this will succeed or have much impact.

So instead, the second thing that the commission proposes is to send most of the cash back to member states in the shape of support for farmers, fishermen, and poorer regions of the bloc.

This is already the biggest section of the budget at the moment -- worth a total of 865 billion euro ($1 trillion) of the 2-trillion-euro proposal.

It probably won’t shrink.

Drilling Down

• Interestingly, there is now a proposal to allocate 131 billion euro ($152 billion) for defense, which would be a fivefold increase compared to the current level.
• Several member states, notably Denmark and France, have indicated that the EU must become more of a military player, especially as the United States might dedicate fewer military resources to the continent in the coming years.
• If the proposal is not watered down, this would signal real intent on the issue.
• So, what about the foreign policy aspects of the commission’s plan?
• It’s all grouped under the heading “A Stronger Europe In The World” and totals €200 billion ($233 billion).
• This is a doubling of the previous budget and contains everything from humanitarian aid, various foreign missions the bloc has -- such as a monitoring mission in Armenia -- to pre-accession funds for EU candidate countries in the Western Balkans and the bloc’s eastern neighborhood.
• The money proposed for pre-accession is around 40 billion euros ($46 billion), an increase from before, but there is still no breakdown of how much cash each country will get.
• What is interesting, however, is that there is a revision clause in the proposal which means that the budget will be reworked if a country joins the club during the 2028-2034 period.
• After all, members tend to get more money than candidate countries. And given that nations like Albania, Montenegro, and possibly even Moldova could join within this time frame, they stand to gain even more.
• It is worth remembering here that Ukraine has been given a separate heading altogether.
• While Kyiv, of course, can benefit from the 200 billion euro of accession and humanitarian cash, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has promised a dedicated 100-billion-euro ($116 billion) pot for the reconstruction of the war-torn country.
• Between 2024 and 2027, this so-called “Ukraine facility” amounts to €50 billion ($58 billion) in loans and grants, financed through common EU borrowing, which all member states guarantee to repay.
• The question is whether a country like Hungary, which has been skeptical about all things Ukraine in recent years, will agree to this -- especially as von der Leyen announced that rule of law conditionality applies to all the funds in the new budget. This conditionality existed to a certain degree in the previous budget and allowed Brussels to freeze billions heading to Budapest.
• Watering down conditionality in order to get more money for Ukraine already seems like one of the many compromises that will now have to be struck for this budget to eventually go through.

Looking Ahead

The European Union is not quite on holiday yet. This week the presidents of the European Commission and European Council Ursula von der Leyen and Antonio Costa, respectively, are heading to Asia.

On July 23, they will be in Tokyo for what is expected to be a cordial EU-Japan summit.

The next day, the atmosphere might be tenser as they jet to Beijing for an EU-China summit in which they will meet with both President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Qiang.

Don’t expect big announcements for either summit.

That's all for this week!

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL's Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two major issues: the EU mulling restrictive measures on Georgia and hitting Moldova’s pro-Moscow opposition with sanctions.

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Wider Europe Briefing: Sanctions Galore As EU Hits Moldovan Opposition, Mulls Targeting Tbilisi

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Briefing #1: The EU Weighs Up Georgia Sanctions

What You Need To Know: As EU foreign ministers gather in Brussels on July 15 for their last official meeting before the summer break, Georgia is once again high on the agenda due to the deteriorating political situation in the South Caucasus republic with the recent arrests of several opposition politicians.

After briefly being discussed by ministers last month, the situation in the country is now a major discussion point -- and more decisive action may be taken this time.

The bloc has so far enacted some symbolic measures against Tbilisi.

In early 2025, Brussels imposed visa requirements on Georgian diplomatic passport holders. It has also refrained from holding high-level political meetings and diverted EU funding from Georgia’s government to civil society.

Deep Background: The most pressing issue this time is whether the bloc -- with the unanimous approval of all 27 member states -- manages to impose any sanctions.

There have been attempts before, notably in January, when the EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas wanted to slap visa bans and asset freezes on 13 individuals linked to the Georgian Dream party for a crackdown on opposition protesters.

Back then, Hungary and Slovakia vetoed any such moves, and sanctions talks stalled in Brussels for a while.

EU officials have in recent weeks also discussed the possibility of blacklisting a couple of people responsible for what an internal EU document seen by RFE/RL calls the “instrumentalization of the justice system by the Georgian authorities.”

This would occur under the “EU global human rights sanctions regime” -- a sanctions framework similar to the US Magnitsky act that already includes more than 100 human rights abusers from various countries, such as China, Libya, Russia, and Sudan.

According to several EU officials familiar with the discussions, more than 10 EU member states -- including France, the Netherlands, Poland, Austria, Sweden and the Baltic trio of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania -- have been pushing for sanctions to be adopted by EU foreign ministers.

Just like in January, Bratislava and Budapest have been resisting the move, arguing that any type of restrictive measure could worsen the situation and that dialogue with Tbilisi is a better approach.

While not siding with Slovakia and Hungary, Greece has been arguing against taking any hasty decisions.

Despite the obvious opposition, many diplomats RFE/RL has spoken to on condition of anonymity believe that there still is a chance of finding a consensus to blacklist at least a couple of Georgian judges, whom the EU deems responsible for the arrest of Georgian oppositionists. It’s believed that sanctions-skeptic countries may accept this instead of targeting high-profile politicians.

Drilling Down

• So, what other options are being discussed? The most obvious one is to suspend visa liberalization for Georgian citizens -- a move that only requires a qualified majority of 55 percent of member states representing 65 percent of the total EU population.
• Sweden is the latest country to push for this, arguing that it can be done temporarily if the situation continues to worsen after Georgian local elections in early October. This view is apparently also supported by the Baltic states, Denmark, France, and Poland.
• Others have expressed reservations, however -- notably Greece and Slovenia. They argue that such a radical move -- with the bloc never having suspended visa liberalization for an EU candidate country before -- should be taken as an absolute last resort.
• It has also been pointed out that such a step would likely have more of a negative impact on ordinary Georgian citizens rather than the country’s leadership. Another alternative proposal put forward by the European Commission is to impose national entry bans on certain individuals.
• This is regarded as a somewhat “softer measure” compared to imposing a blanket suspension of EU visa liberalization or broader sanctions. However, it would only be effective if several member states chose to adopt and coordinate this approach.
• Whether that will happen remains uncertain, as some countries -- such as Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, and Romania -- have stressed that it still is important to keep communication channels open with Tbilisi.
• The internal EU document also mentions the possibility of suspending Georgia’s candidate status, which the bloc unanimously bestowed on the country back in December 2023. The EU, however, has never before unilaterally reversed candidate status in its history (Iceland asked Brussels to remove its EU candidate status back in 2015). Once again, unanimity would be necessary to take this step.
• Finally, there is an option that could likely be achieved this week: a large group of countries, led by the Baltic trio, plans to ask the European External Action Service and the European Commission to conduct a thorough assessment of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement from 2016.
• The goal would be to explore the possibility of suspending parts of the agreement in the future, such as the free trade provisions it includes. Such a suspension would require only a qualified majority.

Briefing #2: Brussels Tightens Stance On Moldova’s Pro-Russian Opposition

What You Need To Know: EU foreign ministers on July 15 are expected to rubber stamp an agreement to impose sanctions on people and entities the bloc deems guilty of “actions destabilizing" Moldova, where Russia still wields massive influence and maintains more than 1,000 troops in the separatist Transdniester region.

The sanctions regime was first adopted in 2023 in an attempt to protect Chisinau from Moscow-backed attempts to wrestle back political control over the country.

So far, 16 people and two organizations are blacklisted, most notably the fugitive oligarchs Vlad Plahotniuc and Ilan Shor, both of whom fled Moldova.

The proposed new batch of listings, seen by RFE/RL, consists of seven individuals and three entities -- all in one way or another linked to Shor.

Deep Background: The Russia-based Shor, whom the Moldovan police believe was responsible for a vote-buying scheme last year that nearly swung the referendum on future EU membership in the Eastern European republic, was a key figure in bank fraud scandal a decade ago in which close to $1 billion was transferred out of Moldovan banks for loans that remained unpaid.

Shor’s political party SOR was outlawed in 2023, but a year later he launched a new political bloc from Moscow called Victory/Pobeda, which is one of the three entities proposed for sanctioning by the EU.

The official sanction text notes that “the Victory/Pobeda Political Bloc is involved in spreading false information and in vote-buying schemes” during both the referendum last year and the presidential election that returned the pro-EU President Maia Sandu to office.

Shor’s company A7 is also listed.

Described by Brussels as a firm “established by Ilan Shor, together with multiple financial companies in Moscow, partnering with Russian state entities” it stands accused of being the vehicle used by him to buy votes.

A7 has also been accused of helping facilitate cross-border financial transfers for Russian clients in the face of Western sanctions.

The third entity on the list is the “Cultural Educational Centre of Moldova” which according to the EU was distributing free vouchers to voters transported to a Moscow polling station, “while simultaneously promoting the ‘Card of the Citizen of the Republic of Moldova' in the Russian Federation’ propaganda program.”

This was, according to the bloc, another activity that Shor and his associates were behind.

Drilling Down

• Another Individuals on the list also appear to be linked to Shor. Alexandru Beșchieru is the leader of the Forța de Alternativă și de Salvare a Moldovei (Alternative and Salvation Force of Moldova) political party, which is one of the successors of the SOR party and now finds itself under the umbrella of the Victory/Pobeda political bloc.
• Victoria Furtuna, the leader of the Moldova Mare (Greater Moldova) party, is another who allegedly has benefited from Shor’s patronage. Moldovan members of parliament Alexandr Nesterovschi and Irina Lozovan, both of the Renastere (Revival) party which is perceived to be yet another successor of the SOR party, are also proposed for blacklisting.
• The pair were sentenced earlier this year to 12 and six years in prison, respectively, for illegal financing of political parties. Both disappeared after their convictions, with Chisinau authorities believing that they currently are hiding in the breakaway Transdniester region.
• The leader of the Renaissance party, Natalia Parasca, is also included in the EU document with the bloc pointing out that she is a member of the board of the already sanctioned entity Evrazia, which according to the files is “actively involved in the illegal financing schemes” of Shor. Vadim Grozavu, leader of the Victory Party and Alexei Lungu, who heads the Chance Party, are also to be blacklisted.
• The EU sanctions do not, however, include the mayor of Chisinau, Ion Ceban.There was confusion on July 9 when the Romanian Foreign Ministry announced on its website that due to national security considerations, Bucharest had barred him from entering Romania.
• That the measure also included a ban on access to the EU’s Schengen area, which encompasses most EU countries as well as non-EU countries such as Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland.
• Ceban will be included in the Schengen Information System (SIS), which is a Schengen area database used for sharing information on border management and security, unless he appeals the decision.
• But that stops short of a full ban as individual European capitals can undercut the Romanian ban by issuing a visa to their country or simply just allowing him entry.

Looking Ahead

On July 16, the European Commission will present its first draft proposal for the next long-term EU budget (2028-2034).

The proposed budget of over a trillion euros ($1.2 trillion) will kick off a debate in Brussels that will drag on for months, as member states will fight among themselves over how much money should be spent on various items.

Perhaps the most interesting question will be how much money will go to EU foreign policy and enlargement, with the bloc expected to take in new members during the new budget period.

That's all for this week!

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.