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A French Air Force Dassault Rafale B fighter jet configured for air-to-air weaponry is deployed at an unspecified location in the Polish airspace during an exercise as part of NATO's Eastern Sentry operation on September 13.
A French Air Force Dassault Rafale B fighter jet configured for air-to-air weaponry is deployed at an unspecified location in the Polish airspace during an exercise as part of NATO's Eastern Sentry operation on September 13.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two major issues: NATO's new eastern flank operation and the likely winner of this year's Sakharov Prize.

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Briefing #1: NATO's New Operation Eastern Sentry

What You Need To Know: Two days after an unprecedented drone incursion by Russia on Polish territory on September 10, NATO unveiled its response: Operation Eastern Sentry. The mission kicked off immediately on September 12 but will be fleshed out further in the coming weeks.

The whole idea, according to the military alliance, is to strengthen its posture, connectivity, and flexibility along NATO's entire eastern flank. While the focus right now is on Russia drones and geographically on Poland, it is multidomain -- meaning land, sea, and air forces are involved -- and is meant to plug gaps from the North Sea to the Black Sea.

It was made clear, however, that it will only be in NATO territory, meaning there are no plans to enter western Ukraine to protect the skies. While Kyiv would very much welcome such a move, and there is an argument for targeting Russian drones much earlier, many NATO allies are fearful this could bring them closer to a direct conflict with the Kremlin.

Deep Background: The key goal now is to move toward an integrated system. Previously, individual NATO allies conducted air policing in different locations, with NATO providing supplementary support on a case-by-case basis, depending on the threat assessment.

The idea now is to have more resources linked to each other across the entire eastern flank, be it missiles or anti-drone technology. It is inspired by a similar operation, Baltic Sentry, which was launched earlier this year as a response to a number of alleged undersea sabotage activities by Moscow in the Baltic Sea.

NATO officials RFE/RL has been in touch with on condition of anonymity view that operation as a success, pointing out there have been no recent attempts to sever cables or other infrastructure in the region. And while it will be trickier to prevent all drones from getting into NATO territory, the thinking here is a beefed-up presence will make "Russia think twice before testing again."

Eight countries have already joined Eastern Sentry and placed assets at the disposal of NATO's supreme allied commander (SACEUR) Alexus Grynkewich. More are expected to follow suit.

France was the first to come forward -- with three Rafale fighter jets, which are to be stationed in Poland, as well as an Airbus A400M military transport aircraft. Britain will have some of its Typhoon jets fly defense missions in Polish skies, and Germany has moved four of its Eurofighters closer to its eastern neighbor, ready to conduct sorties at any moment.

Italy and Denmark have both also signaled they will provide jets. Additionally, Copenhagen has deployed a military ship in the eastern Baltic Sea. Spain and Sweden will also contribute, while the Czech Republic is actually placing some special forces troops in Poland and sending three helicopters, as well.

Drilling Down:

  • Two things stand out here. First, the lack of any new American assets being provided to Eastern Sentry so far. When asked about this at a press briefing, Grynkewich half-joked that "as far as US military assets [are concerned]…I'm right here, and I'm involved" before adding that "the United States commitment to the integrated military structure of the Alliance remains."
  • The United States has more than 10,000 troops stationed in Poland, and that number could even increase. While there are widespread reports about Washington redeploying military personnel from Europe to Asian theaters, NATO officials who spoke to RFE/RL were adamant they have been given no indication troop numbers will be reduced on the eastern flank anytime soon.
  • The second issue is that the commitment to Eastern Sentry has so far been very focused on expensive fighter jets and other costly equipment. This was one of the criticisms of the Polish and NATO response to the September 10 incursion: that multimillion-dollar fighter jets were used for protection against cheap drones.
  • While some European officials admit that Warsaw wants "a show of force," others acknowledge this isn't economically sustainable in the long run. Or as one senior NATO official put it: "We, of course, recognize that the best way to defeat drones is not with a very expensive missile fired from a very, very expensive plane."
  • Eastern Sentry is thus a sort of sudden measure until a potential "drone wall" can become a reality and complement what is already out there.
  • NATO will be central to building such a system, and with the EU signaling readiness to fund it, the project looks likely to happen, but it is two to three years away in the best-case scenario.
  • In the meantime, the military alliance is looking at Latvia's pioneering work with acoustic sensors that detect drones faster, as well as new munitions that allow aircraft to use cheaper weapons, both of which could happen rather quickly.
  • Mobile fire teams are another model NATO could adapt from Ukraine's experience. Kyiv has been using these small, fast-moving units armed with machine guns or man-portable air-defense systems with increasing success on the battlefield.
  • As Grynkewich put it when pressed by the media after unveiling Eastern Sentry: "It's time to take a fresh look at this. And we're always learning. NATO is a learning organization."


Briefing #2: Who Will Win This Year's Sakharov Prize?

What You Need To Know: The awards season is upon us -- at least when it comes to prizes of strong political resonance. All eyes will, of course, be on the Norwegian Nobel Committee when it announces the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize on October 10, especially as some countries have nominated US President Donald Trump. But there is another prestigious honor that will be announced this fall -- the annual Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, the European Union's top human rights award.

While the American president has not been proposed for this 50,000 euro ($59,000) prize, many individuals and organizations from RFE/RL's coverage area were nominated, including Serbian student protesters, the Budapest Pride event, Polish-Belarusian journalist Andrzej Poczobut, and Georgian journalist Mzia Amaglobeli together with her country's pro-democracy movement. They are up against other nominees such as Palestinian journalists and development workers, and, rather controversially, the recently assassinated American conservative political activist Charlie Kirk.

Deep Background: The award is run entirely by the European Parliament. Created in 1988 in honor of the Russian scientist and dissident Andrei Sakharov, it has become one of the chamber's key public relations tools, with repressive regimes often lashing out at European lawmakers over some nominations and winners.

It is not uncommon for Sakharov Prize winners to go on to win the Nobel Peace Prize down the line, with examples including the Pakistani education activist Malala Yousafzai and the Congolese humanitarian Denis Mukwege.

The nominations -- which this year will be officially presented on September 23 at a joint session of the European Parliament's foreign affairs, development and human rights committees -- are usually put forward by the parliament's various political groups or at least 40 its members (MEPs). The deadline for these nominations passed last week, and the groups have already publicly communicated who their respective nominees are.

The September 23 event is essentially an occasion to make the public case for your nominee because the political jockeying about which three will be shortlisted -- and who the eventual winner will be -- starts now.

Drilling Down:

  • Size also matters. The shortlisting happens on October 16 this year, when members of the European Parliament's foreign affairs and development committees will hold a secret vote on their favorite.
  • It's strictly one member, one vote, and the three candidates who get the most support are the ones shortlisted. Since the ballot is secret, no one officially communicates the final result, but the media tend to get hold of the numbers and it tends to be tight. Normally less than a handful of ballots determines the final trio.
  • Party discipline is key, with MEPs often pressured to vote for the candidate put forward by their political group. With membership of the two committees determined by the size of the political groups, it becomes a numbers game.
  • Things are complicated further by nominees who aren't backed by a political group but rather by a collection of MEPs across the political spectrum. This makes everything rather unpredictable.
  • That unpredictability often prevails all the way up until the final decision, which will be taken on October 22. This is not made by any committee, however, but by the European Parliament's Conference of Presidents, which consists of the president of the chamber, Roberta Metsola, and leaders of the eight political groups. The vote is secret as well and deliberations can be long, but again: The bigger the political group, the weightier its vote.
  • Who will be shortlisted and who will be the eventual winner? Logic suggests it will be Andrzej Poczobut given he is backed by the largest group in the chamber, the center-right European People's Party (EPP).
  • "They tend to get their way." as one European Parliament official recently put it to RFE/RL when discussing the prize. It helps Poczobut has also been nominated by the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), the fourth-largest group. These two teamed up in 2024 to successfully promote the Venezuelan opposition politicians Maria Corina Machado and Edmundo Gonzalez for the Sakharov award.
  • Officials from the EPP and the ECR told RFE/RL they believe a win for Poczobut could help him get released from prison, especially since Aleksandr Lukashenko's authoritarian regime has started to free political prisoners. The releases follow a sweeping crackdown on civil society and opposition activity after Belarus's disputed 2020 presidential election, which was widely condemned as rigged.
  • But it is far from certain that Poczobut will get the nod. The second-biggest group, the center-left S&D, has put forward journalists and humanitarian aid workers in conflict zones represented by the Palestinian Press Association, the Palestine Red Crescent Society, and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency.
  • The more left-wing and smaller Left group has nominated a number of Palestinian journalists. If these two consolidated their respective nominations and chose a Palestinian individual or organization, they could potentially have the numbers to prevail.
  • The numbers probably won't favor Budapest Pride, put forward by the Greens, who aren't much of a political force these days, nor the Serbian student protesters backed by the liberal Renew group, which is only the fifth-largest grouping. Charlie Kirk is also a nonstarter as he is favored by the smallest faction, the far-right Europe of Sovereign Nations, which no other political family wants to cooperate with.
  • One potential dark horse and a possible compromise choice is the jailed Georgian journalist Mzia Amaglobeli, who is backed by 61 MEPs from various political parties. Normally, that might not be enough to even get her shortlisted. But almost all political groups -- including both the EPP and S&D -- considered nominating her before opting for others.
  • Amaglobeli is widely recognized and admired in the chamber. A Georgian has never won the prize before, and the house is keen to send a message to Tbilisi. It's a long shot, though, as political groups tend to be disciplined, but this year the race is more open than ever.

Looking Ahead

On September 26-27 the chiefs of defense of NATO's 32 member states meet in Riga, Latvia for their annual autumn gathering. The meeting will be closely watched by media considering both the recent incursion of Russian drones in Polish and Romanian airspace and the violation of Estonian airspace by a Russian fighter jet a few days later. The military alliance has beefed up the presence on its eastern flank, but expect a lot of questions about what more NATO can do to protect its citizens.

That's all for this week!

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two major issues: the next EU sanctions package to hit the Kremlin & the talks about creating a "drone wall" on the EU’s eastern flank.

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Briefing #1: What's Next For EU Sanctions On Russia?

What You Need To Know: The European Commission will present a new sanctions package proposal on Russia to the club's 27 member states early next week to further ratchet up pressure on the Kremlin, including measures aimed at curtailing Russian oil, which US President Donald Trump has called on Europe to stop purchasing.

Measures against Russia over its full-scale invasion of Ukraine will also target more banks, the Kremlin's so-called shadow fleet -- transport for Moscow to skirt sanctions -- third-country firms, and the blacklisting of a number of individuals, especially those deemed responsible for the abduction of Ukrainian children.

The thing to look out for, according to analysts and diplomats, is whether Brussels will manage to limit Russian tourist visas and prevent Russian diplomats from moving around inside the union.

Deep Background: The EU is looking to synchronize measures with the United States after EU sanctions envoy David O'Sullivan last week went to Washington to coordinate measures against the Kremlin after Trump said he had run out of patience with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin.

Several EU officials with knowledge of the proposal note that the main scope of the new sanctions proposals offers a continuation of what the bloc already served up in previous rounds of measures.

This means targeting more Russian banks, including smaller regional banks, by cutting them out from the international banking messaging system SWIFT.

The sanctions package will also hit Moscow's ability to use crypto currencies and ban more vessels believed to belong to Russia's shadow fleet from being serviced in any way in Europe. The current list includes 444 boats, but the bloc believes the Kremlin is using at least double that amount to transport its sanctioned oil products worldwide.

There might also be attempts to target Russian oil giant Lukoil, even though some member states -- notably Slovakia and Hungary, who still rely on Russian oil imports -- will likely veto that. The EU has set a goal of ridding itself of Russian energy imports by 2027 using EU internal market rules, meaning a qualified majority of member states is sufficient to endorse that legislation as supposed to the unanimity used for regular sanctions laws.

Drilling Down:

  1. Over the weekend, Trump said he is willing to impose sanctions on Russia but that Europe has to act in tandem by halting its oil purchases.
  2. "Europe is buying oil from Russia. I don't want them to buy oil," Trump told reporters on September 14. "The sanctions...that they're putting on are not tough enough, and I'm willing to do sanctions, but they're going to have to toughen up their sanctions commensurate with what I'm doing."
  3. Other potential energy sanctions include slapping restrictive measures on refineries responsible for exporting Russian oil to the EU as well as third-country trading companies involved in its trade.
  4. The EU won't, however, heed Trump's call to slap 100 percent tariffs on India and China for buying Russian oil. Brussels is not yet ready to sanction third countries for aiding Moscow in its war effort in Ukraine but companies from those nations could be targeted.
  5. It remains to be seen if there is a Belarus component in this sanctions package. In previous rounds, the bloc has imposed similar measures on Moscow and Minsk, but with the United States now lifting some of its sanctions on Belarus in exchange for the release of several hundreds of political prisoners it remains up to negotiations among EU member states how they will approach the Lukashenko regime.
  6. It requires unanimity to lift sanctions, and both Poland and Lithuania have indicated they won't consider any loosening of restrictive measures against Minsk yet.
  7. One other interesting proposal, first floated by the Czech Republic over a year ago, is to limit the movement of Russian diplomats inside the EU. This means their movement would be limited to the state to which they are accredited and they'd need special authorization to travel elsewhere.
  8. In practice, this is quite difficult to implement due to the lack of border controls inside the EU's Schengen Zone, of which most member states are a part. The idea, therefore, is that the person would be declared persona non grata and expelled if he or she is caught traveling outside the state of diplomatic accreditation.
  9. Then there is the possibility of how far the bloc will go when it comes to tourist visas for Russian citizens.
  10. There is a push by some to issue a complete ban, a measure that would need a qualified majority of 55 percent of member states representing 65 percent of the population.
  11. This comes after several countries in the bloc noted a considerable uptick in Russian tourists visiting during the summer months. In many ways this could pit more hawkish EU member states such as the Baltics, Nordics, and Poland against southern member states that rely to a larger degree on tourism.
  12. Eventually it could just result in a general recommendation from the European Commission to try to limit member states to issue tourist visas.
  13. The EU suspended its visa facilitation agreement with Russia shortly after the full-scale invasion in February 2022 and issued guidelines to member states on how to deal with Russian visa requests.
  14. Those recommendations noted that "Russian visa applicants traveling for essential purposes, including notably family members of EU citizens, dissidents, independent journalists, civil society representatives, and human rights defenders should have the possibility to access the EU."
  15. It also recommended that "As far as Russian citizens traveling for tourism are concerned, having a very strict approach is justified as it is more difficult to assess the justification for the journey, as compared to other purposes (business trip, family visits or medical appointment)."
  16. It could very well be that the bloc agrees to tighten that up even further if there isn't agreement on a total tourist visa ban.


Briefing #2: A 'Drone Wall' On The NATO's Eastern Flank?

What You Need To Know: Russia's drone incursion into Polish territory on September 10 failed to result in much physical damage on the ground, but it did uncover a major hole in Europe's defense forces: The allies don't have cost-effective counter-measures to deal with low-cost Russian attacks. As many as 19 drones flew into Polish -- and thus NATO -- airspace.

Four appeared to have been shot down. An explanation from some European officials, who spoke to RFE/RL on background, is that priority was given to those drones that seemed to be headed toward critical infrastructure.

Given the limited damage to property and no casualties on the ground, such a strategy seemed justified. But many are asking why there was a need to rely on expensive AWACS and fighter jets such as F-35s and not a much cheaper anti-drone system, such as Sky CTRL, that Poland uses.

The answer could be, of course, that the air force automatically engages when an interloper flies above a certain altitude. In many countries that is usually anything above 3 kilometers.

Deep Background: NATO chief Mark Rutte said the alliance's response was "very successful" and "showed that we are able to defend every inch of NATO territory, including, of course, its airspace."

Still, the incident poses awkward questions, especially if the Kremlin continues to test NATO countries in a similar way in the future. It also exposes holes in how the alliance has prepared, or not prepared, for a new age of warfare where drones are used extensively. NATO's response to the drone incursion appears financially unsustainable and militarily inefficient.

As one European official, speaking under condition of anonymity, told RFE/RL: "Air-to-air missiles are extremely costly to use against cheap Russian drones, and if 800 are being sent at once, which happens in Ukraine, Europe will burn through its entire arsenal in just weeks."

It was quite telling that NATO's North Atlantic Council -- which met the day after the incursion -- requested a review of the military alliance's eastern flank deterrence for potential gaps. NATO's commander is likely find some glaring ones. Only this year there have been incidents with alleged Russian UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) in Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania.

In August, one drone slipped through undetected before exploding on Polish soil, according to the country's military.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen's annual state of the European Union speech this week made it clear the bloc needs to up its drone defense when she committed to a 6 billion loan to enter a "drone alliance" with Ukraine. But more intriguingly she also floated an "Eastern Flank Watch" that she said will provide "real-time space surveillance" to track all aerial movement from the Baltic to the Black Sea.

Drilling Down:

  • She also committed to building "a drone wall" -- something her own commission initially rejected to fund when Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania asked for European cash earlier this year for just such a venture.
  • There are few details about all this just yet: no concrete budget figures, precise geographical scope, or timeline other than that the European Commission is expected to present a roadmap with new common defense projects in October.
  • But the fact remains that the drone wall, the flank watch, and actual drone production are part of the same picture -- and it's one being drawn up with or without EU funding. First of all, there are two ongoing and similar projects: the Baltic trio's "Baltic Defense Line" and Poland's "East Shield."
  • Both projects, announced last year, will take up to a decade to complete and are designed to "fortify" borders with Belarus and Russia, including the Kaliningrad exclave. Billions of euros have already been earmarked.
  • Plenty of investment will go into classical, physical obstacles such as hundreds of bunkers, fences, ditches, and moats. But there is also the technological aspect to these defense lines.
  • The idea is that imagery and signal intelligence and acoustic monitoring will be used for surveillance. Base stations spread out along the defense line, as well as masts, will process the data and connect with weapon systems -- crucially drones designed to take down enemy drones.
  • This is the drone wall, at least in theory. What first started as an Estonian defense industry idea last year to cover the Baltic trio, dubbed the Baltic Drone Wall, has morphed into a NATO idea -- the Drone Wall -- as German firms are keen to invest and Norway, Finland, and Poland are keen to get onboard as well.
  • If the EU as an institution comes onboard with funding, it is quite possible this wall will stretch even further south even though Ukraine, arguably the leader in drone technology, essentially is covering countries like Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania with its drone arsenal.
  • The key now is what this wall will look like and when it can be installed. The most complex models have up to five levels that include acoustic sensors, mobile cameras, radars, jammers, and drone interceptors.
  • With all these aspects included, it is estimated it may take two to three years to set up as tens of thousands of sensors need to be planted along the borders. Depending on the geographical scope, the main challenge will largely come from sharing and integrating all the information from all systems.
  • Ideally, NATO should be in charge. But the bigger issue is how and whether it will work in practice. While most technologies are more or less ready and items such as sensors easily can be scaled up, the issue right now is drones. And it is here Ukraine and the potential "drone alliance" come into the picture.
  • The country currently produces some 4 million drones a year and hopes to double that capacity. Most of these drones will obviously be needed in the country as it fights off Russian attacks. What the Europeans instead want from Kyiv is know-how.
  • A European official with knowledge of the matter told RFE/RL that the idea rather is to use the models and engineering ideas being tested on the Ukrainian battlefield and then scale it up inside the block, potentially with the help of European automotive giants that could free up capacity.


Looking Ahead

Both Ukraine and Moldova are currently stuck on its path towards EU membership, as are many of the EU candidate countries in the Western Balkans. But there is one country that seem to be marching towards the bloc in a brisk pace – Albania.

On September 16, the country will open negotiations on another four accession chapters, meaning that Tirana in a little over the year have open talks on the vast majority of the 33 policy chapters needed to become a member.

The key thing to join is of course to close talks in all these fields but right now the country is proceeding quickly to catch up the current EU membership frontrunner Montenegro.

That's all for this week!

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

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About The Newsletter

The Wider Europe newsletter briefs you every Tuesday morning on key issues concerning the EU, NATO, and other institutions’ relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe’s Eastern neighborhoods.

For more than a decade as a correspondent in Brussels, Rikard Jozwiak covered all the major events and crises related to the EU’s neighborhood and how various Western institutions reacted to them -- the war in Georgia, the annexation of Crimea, Russia’s support for separatists in eastern Ukraine, the downing of MH17, dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, the EU and NATO enlargement processes in the Western Balkans, as well as visa liberalizations, free-trade deals, and countless summits.

Now out of the “Brussels bubble,” but still looking in -- this time from the heart of Europe, in Prague -- he continues to focus on the countries where Brussels holds huge sway, but also faces serious competition from other players, such as Russia and, increasingly, China.

To subscribe, click here.

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