Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.
I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two major issues: the next EU sanctions package to hit the Kremlin & the talks about creating a "drone wall" on the EU’s eastern flank.
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Wider Europe Briefing: September 16, 2025
Briefing #1: What's Next For EU Sanctions On Russia?
What You Need To Know: The European Commission will present a new sanctions package proposal on Russia to the club's 27 member states early next week to further ratchet up pressure on the Kremlin, including measures aimed at curtailing Russian oil, which US President Donald Trump has called on Europe to stop purchasing.
Measures against Russia over its full-scale invasion of Ukraine will also target more banks, the Kremlin's so-called shadow fleet -- transport for Moscow to skirt sanctions -- third-country firms, and the blacklisting of a number of individuals, especially those deemed responsible for the abduction of Ukrainian children.
The thing to look out for, according to analysts and diplomats, is whether Brussels will manage to limit Russian tourist visas and prevent Russian diplomats from moving around inside the union.
Deep Background: The EU is looking to synchronize measures with the United States after EU sanctions envoy David O'Sullivan last week went to Washington to coordinate measures against the Kremlin after Trump said he had run out of patience with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin.
Several EU officials with knowledge of the proposal note that the main scope of the new sanctions proposals offers a continuation of what the bloc already served up in previous rounds of measures.
This means targeting more Russian banks, including smaller regional banks, by cutting them out from the international banking messaging system SWIFT.
The sanctions package will also hit Moscow's ability to use crypto currencies and ban more vessels believed to belong to Russia's shadow fleet from being serviced in any way in Europe. The current list includes 444 boats, but the bloc believes the Kremlin is using at least double that amount to transport its sanctioned oil products worldwide.
There might also be attempts to target Russian oil giant Lukoil, even though some member states -- notably Slovakia and Hungary, who still rely on Russian oil imports -- will likely veto that. The EU has set a goal of ridding itself of Russian energy imports by 2027 using EU internal market rules, meaning a qualified majority of member states is sufficient to endorse that legislation as supposed to the unanimity used for regular sanctions laws.
Drilling Down:
- Over the weekend, Trump said he is willing to impose sanctions on Russia but that Europe has to act in tandem by halting its oil purchases.
- "Europe is buying oil from Russia. I don't want them to buy oil," Trump told reporters on September 14. "The sanctions...that they're putting on are not tough enough, and I'm willing to do sanctions, but they're going to have to toughen up their sanctions commensurate with what I'm doing."
- Other potential energy sanctions include slapping restrictive measures on refineries responsible for exporting Russian oil to the EU as well as third-country trading companies involved in its trade.
- The EU won't, however, heed Trump's call to slap 100 percent tariffs on India and China for buying Russian oil. Brussels is not yet ready to sanction third countries for aiding Moscow in its war effort in Ukraine but companies from those nations could be targeted.
- It remains to be seen if there is a Belarus component in this sanctions package. In previous rounds, the bloc has imposed similar measures on Moscow and Minsk, but with the United States now lifting some of its sanctions on Belarus in exchange for the release of several hundreds of political prisoners it remains up to negotiations among EU member states how they will approach the Lukashenko regime.
- It requires unanimity to lift sanctions, and both Poland and Lithuania have indicated they won't consider any loosening of restrictive measures against Minsk yet.
- One other interesting proposal, first floated by the Czech Republic over a year ago, is to limit the movement of Russian diplomats inside the EU. This means their movement would be limited to the state to which they are accredited and they'd need special authorization to travel elsewhere.
- In practice, this is quite difficult to implement due to the lack of border controls inside the EU's Schengen Zone, of which most member states are a part. The idea, therefore, is that the person would be declared persona non grata and expelled if he or she is caught traveling outside the state of diplomatic accreditation.
- Then there is the possibility of how far the bloc will go when it comes to tourist visas for Russian citizens.
- There is a push by some to issue a complete ban, a measure that would need a qualified majority of 55 percent of member states representing 65 percent of the population.
- This comes after several countries in the bloc noted a considerable uptick in Russian tourists visiting during the summer months. In many ways this could pit more hawkish EU member states such as the Baltics, Nordics, and Poland against southern member states that rely to a larger degree on tourism.
- Eventually it could just result in a general recommendation from the European Commission to try to limit member states to issue tourist visas.
- The EU suspended its visa facilitation agreement with Russia shortly after the full-scale invasion in February 2022 and issued guidelines to member states on how to deal with Russian visa requests.
- Those recommendations noted that "Russian visa applicants traveling for essential purposes, including notably family members of EU citizens, dissidents, independent journalists, civil society representatives, and human rights defenders should have the possibility to access the EU."
- It also recommended that "As far as Russian citizens traveling for tourism are concerned, having a very strict approach is justified as it is more difficult to assess the justification for the journey, as compared to other purposes (business trip, family visits or medical appointment)."
- It could very well be that the bloc agrees to tighten that up even further if there isn't agreement on a total tourist visa ban.
Briefing #2: A 'Drone Wall' On The NATO's Eastern Flank?
What You Need To Know: Russia's drone incursion into Polish territory on September 10 failed to result in much physical damage on the ground, but it did uncover a major hole in Europe's defense forces: The allies don't have cost-effective counter-measures to deal with low-cost Russian attacks. As many as 19 drones flew into Polish -- and thus NATO -- airspace.
Four appeared to have been shot down. An explanation from some European officials, who spoke to RFE/RL on background, is that priority was given to those drones that seemed to be headed toward critical infrastructure.
Given the limited damage to property and no casualties on the ground, such a strategy seemed justified. But many are asking why there was a need to rely on expensive AWACS and fighter jets such as F-35s and not a much cheaper anti-drone system, such as Sky CTRL, that Poland uses.
The answer could be, of course, that the air force automatically engages when an interloper flies above a certain altitude. In many countries that is usually anything above 3 kilometers.
Deep Background: NATO chief Mark Rutte said the alliance's response was "very successful" and "showed that we are able to defend every inch of NATO territory, including, of course, its airspace."
Still, the incident poses awkward questions, especially if the Kremlin continues to test NATO countries in a similar way in the future. It also exposes holes in how the alliance has prepared, or not prepared, for a new age of warfare where drones are used extensively. NATO's response to the drone incursion appears financially unsustainable and militarily inefficient.
As one European official, speaking under condition of anonymity, told RFE/RL: "Air-to-air missiles are extremely costly to use against cheap Russian drones, and if 800 are being sent at once, which happens in Ukraine, Europe will burn through its entire arsenal in just weeks."
It was quite telling that NATO's North Atlantic Council -- which met the day after the incursion -- requested a review of the military alliance's eastern flank deterrence for potential gaps. NATO's commander is likely find some glaring ones. Only this year there have been incidents with alleged Russian UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) in Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania.
In August, one drone slipped through undetected before exploding on Polish soil, according to the country's military.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen's annual state of the European Union speech this week made it clear the bloc needs to up its drone defense when she committed to a 6 billion loan to enter a "drone alliance" with Ukraine. But more intriguingly she also floated an "Eastern Flank Watch" that she said will provide "real-time space surveillance" to track all aerial movement from the Baltic to the Black Sea.
Drilling Down:
- She also committed to building "a drone wall" -- something her own commission initially rejected to fund when Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania asked for European cash earlier this year for just such a venture.
- There are few details about all this just yet: no concrete budget figures, precise geographical scope, or timeline other than that the European Commission is expected to present a roadmap with new common defense projects in October.
- But the fact remains that the drone wall, the flank watch, and actual drone production are part of the same picture -- and it's one being drawn up with or without EU funding. First of all, there are two ongoing and similar projects: the Baltic trio's "Baltic Defense Line" and Poland's "East Shield."
- Both projects, announced last year, will take up to a decade to complete and are designed to "fortify" borders with Belarus and Russia, including the Kaliningrad exclave. Billions of euros have already been earmarked.
- Plenty of investment will go into classical, physical obstacles such as hundreds of bunkers, fences, ditches, and moats. But there is also the technological aspect to these defense lines.
- The idea is that imagery and signal intelligence and acoustic monitoring will be used for surveillance. Base stations spread out along the defense line, as well as masts, will process the data and connect with weapon systems -- crucially drones designed to take down enemy drones.
- This is the drone wall, at least in theory. What first started as an Estonian defense industry idea last year to cover the Baltic trio, dubbed the Baltic Drone Wall, has morphed into a NATO idea -- the Drone Wall -- as German firms are keen to invest and Norway, Finland, and Poland are keen to get onboard as well.
- If the EU as an institution comes onboard with funding, it is quite possible this wall will stretch even further south even though Ukraine, arguably the leader in drone technology, essentially is covering countries like Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania with its drone arsenal.
- The key now is what this wall will look like and when it can be installed. The most complex models have up to five levels that include acoustic sensors, mobile cameras, radars, jammers, and drone interceptors.
- With all these aspects included, it is estimated it may take two to three years to set up as tens of thousands of sensors need to be planted along the borders. Depending on the geographical scope, the main challenge will largely come from sharing and integrating all the information from all systems.
- Ideally, NATO should be in charge. But the bigger issue is how and whether it will work in practice. While most technologies are more or less ready and items such as sensors easily can be scaled up, the issue right now is drones. And it is here Ukraine and the potential "drone alliance" come into the picture.
- The country currently produces some 4 million drones a year and hopes to double that capacity. Most of these drones will obviously be needed in the country as it fights off Russian attacks. What the Europeans instead want from Kyiv is know-how.
- A European official with knowledge of the matter told RFE/RL that the idea rather is to use the models and engineering ideas being tested on the Ukrainian battlefield and then scale it up inside the block, potentially with the help of European automotive giants that could free up capacity.
Looking Ahead
Both Ukraine and Moldova are currently stuck on its path towards EU membership, as are many of the EU candidate countries in the Western Balkans. But there is one country that seem to be marching towards the bloc in a brisk pace – Albania.
On September 16, the country will open negotiations on another four accession chapters, meaning that Tirana in a little over the year have open talks on the vast majority of the 33 policy chapters needed to become a member.
The key thing to join is of course to close talks in all these fields but right now the country is proceeding quickly to catch up the current EU membership frontrunner Montenegro.
That's all for this week!
Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.
Until next time,
Rikard Jozwiak
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