Frank Sobchak, a retired US Army colonel and professor at the US Naval War College, says that the use of drones in the Ukraine war has created a stalemate reminiscent of World War I.
RFE/RL: Let's start with your take on the ongoing Russian offensive, which seems to be faring better than many expected. What is the reality on the battlefield?
Frank Sobchak: I think this really plays into the broader question of where the conflict stands. In many ways, it resembles a World War I-style static war: Russia making tiny, incremental gains --sometimes just a square kilometer a day. According to the Institute for the Study of War, if Russia continues advancing at this rate, it would take them 300 years to occupy Ukraine.
RFE/RL: But the tempo has increased in recent weeks. The situation became extremely dire near Pokrovsk and Kupyansk, where the Russians achieved a tactical breakthrough and then were pushed back by Ukrainian forces. What's your assessment of the current situation?
Sobchak: I'd look at this more strategically than tactically. Tactically, what we see is two boxers in a ring trading blows. The strategic question is: Who tires first? Who folds and goes down? That ties into two things -- the defense industrial base and willpower. On willpower, both sides remain extraordinarily strong. There's nothing from Russia suggesting they've abandoned their maximalist war aims. Ukraine's determination is also intact. Yes, there are fissures and cracks on both sides, but nothing decisive.
At the tactical level we see World War I-level stasis. Part of this is caused by that war of wills, the two boxers who are still trading blows. The other major factor causing a static front is drones. In World War I, it was caused by machine guns, artillery, and poison gas; today it boils down to drones. Their impact is twofold. First, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance: Each side now has a far clearer picture of what's happening behind enemy lines than in almost any past conflict.
SEE ALSO: Russia 'Not Interested' In Peace, Zelenskyy Adviser Tells RFE/RLRFE/RL: Which makes tactical surprise much harder.
Sobchak: Absolutely. But because surprise is now exponentially harder, whenever one side does manage to pull it off, the rewards are even greater. Ukrainians have shown that, when they achieved operational level surprise, if not strategic surprise, during their Kursk offensive. The second factor is that drones have become, in many ways, the poor man's air force -- the poor man's close air support. They've allowed Ukraine to achieve something like air parity. Russia certainly does not have air dominance, contrary to early predictions from many Western analysts. Drones have leveled the playing field. Both sides can launch effective strikes on infantry and armor, making large-scale troop concentrations and rapid advances nearly impossible.
RFE/RL: So no major breakthroughs to expect anytime soon?
Sobchak: It's unlikely. But having studied military history since I was 10, my impression is that wars like this tend to go very slowly, until suddenly they go very fast. To return to the boxing metaphor: when one fighter is finally ground down and can no longer keep his guard up, that's when the knockout punch lands. Once the cracks we see now start to widen and shatter then we could see a rapid collapse of one of the two sides -- provided the war drags on long enough to get there.
RFE/RL: How painful a punch would it be if Russia captured Pokrovsk? Would that count as a strategic breakthrough, maybe even a knockout blow?
Sobchak: I don't think so. It would certainly give Russia a tactical advantage but not a decisive one. The idea that they could exploit such a breakthrough with large-scale maneuver warfare strikes me as extremely unlikely, unless the Ukrainian army itself shattered -- and that's nowhere in sight. The most likely outcome of a Russian capture of Pokrovsk would simply be a tactical advance. For one thing, Russia no longer has much maneuver capability. They have already burned through most of their Cold War–era stockpiles. The massive supply of armor and vehicles we used to associate with Soviet forces -- that's gone. They simply don't have that capability, at least not right now.
And even if they somehow did, they don't have the training to conduct combined-arms maneuver warfare. That is a very complex undertaking. It requires extensive training and preparation at all levels [and] leadership down through the chain of command.
RFE/RL: And that kind of maneuver warfare is essentially NATO doctrine not Russia's.
Sobchak: Exactly. The Russian way of war is the opposite of the American way. The American way is: Send a bullet, not a man. Use technology, artillery, or aircraft to solve the problem. The Russian way is: send men. Keep feeding them into the meat grinder until the grinder breaks. That's why large-scale maneuver warfare is so unlikely for them -- and why I don't see an operational breakthrough happening.
SEE ALSO: How Ukraine Uses Net-Firing Drones To Snag Russian UAVsRFE/RL: Speaking of the outsized impact drones have gained in this war, would it be fair to say they have taken the crown from artillery as the king of the battlefield?
Sobchak: That's a great question. Artillery has traditionally been thought of in terms of mass: You can concentrate battalions, regiments, companies, and deliver a tremendous amount of firepower into a single area. If you look at the sheer numbers of drones now being produced domestically by Ukraine, there's unquestionably "mass" there too -- though each individual drone round often carries less explosive power than a 152- or 155-millimeter shell. So, in terms of pure firepower, artillery probably still has the edge. But what we're really seeing is a shift. Particularly on the NATO side. There was a perception that artillery was evolving away from massed barrages toward precision fire. Now drones are filling that gap.
RFE/RL: Another aspect often discussed is artillery's impact on ground forces. Unlike human soldiers, a drone can be shot down, but it won't suffer shell shock. It doesn't have a nervous breakdown because missiles are raining from the sky.
Sobchak: Absolutely. And drones also have their own way of inflicting devastating psychological terror. Watch the videos of Russians panicking, running for cover, diving into bunkers -- often a first drone breaches a position, then a second flies in after them. It's personal. There's a terrifying nature to being hunted in such a way, as opposed to being subjected to indiscriminate artillery fire. That said, you can also "shell-shock" the human crews who operate and guide the drones, I suppose.
RFE/RL: If the guidance and second-to-second operation gradually shifts into the hands of AI -- which seems to be the preferred dynamic -- does that tip the balance decisively toward drones?
Sobchak: Yes, for sure. We're on the cusp -- if we haven't already arrived -- of a revolution in warfare, with AI providing terminal guidance for drones. So far, we haven't seen drones with complete AI control, where the human is entirely out of the loop. But the key word there is "yet." As the struggle grinds on, as countries grow more desperate in this boxing match of attrition, options that once seemed below the belt and unconscionable may start to look like the best course of action.
RFE/RL: How much has the introduction of drones alleviated the acute manpower shortage Ukraine has been suffering from?
Sobchak: It's played a very important role. Drones have become central to Ukraine's defense industrial base. There's even talk of producing up to a million drones a year. That scale would absolutely help offset some of the manpower shortages.
RFE/RL: And what about the Russians? How well are they keeping up and adapting?
Sobchak: The Russians have shown themselves to be quite adaptive. The old stereotype of Russia as purely a World War I or II-style meat grinder underestimates their ability to innovate, and we're seeing that now.
At the same time, their industrial base is bigger. Much of what we've seen from Russia's drone capabilities -- particularly the strikes on Ukrainian cities, which have become more frequent lately -- are powered by Iranian drones, especially the Shaheds.
Increasingly, many of those are produced domestically inside Russia. They've also developed their own systems, like the Rubicon, and they're ramping up production of interceptor drones. That could be a real problem for Ukraine unless it adapts further and stays one step ahead in the innovation race.
The bigger strategic question is whether Russia's allies will continue to step up. North Korea has provided millions of artillery rounds and tens of thousands of soldiers, with reports of more soldiers on the way. Will that continue? Will Iran keep supplying them at the same volume, now that it has other preoccupations? That's unclear. And frankly, the single biggest factor remains what the United States does. To put it bluntly, Ukraine's success depends on the US. With half of Ukraine's military aid coming from America -- if that ever goes away -- it would create a profound strategic problem. And US policy since 2014 has been, let's just say, erratic.
RFE/RL: Let's talk about the deal [US] President [Donald] Trump struck with NATO -- Europeans buying arms from the US to give to Ukraine. Does it carry the same limitations as before? Could we see, for example, Tomahawk [cruise missiles] included in such a package? If it's all about transactions, I'm sure NATO would discover some previously hidden coffers to open -- provided the US is willing to sell.
Sobchak: It does indeed appear that using NATO as an agent to purchase and then deliver weapons seems to be the new US policy. Whether or not that carries the same limitations as before is still to be seen, but if I had to guess I don't think it will change the equation significantly. Whether or not Tomahawks will be included is also up in the air, but I would offer that there is no single weapon system that would turn the tide in favor of either side. The core of the conflict is about national will, defense industrial base, and manpower. Victory for one side or the other will only come when one of those boxers collapses from exhaustion first.
RFE/RL: And it looks like Ukraine isn't going to sit and wait either. Kyiv has pressed ahead with its own production of the new Flamingo missile -- a system many say is comparable and, in some areas, even superior to the American counterpart. How significant could this be for the battlefield balance?
Sobchak: While Ukraine's new Flamingo missile certainly is a tactical innovation, I would put it in the category of Tomahawk cruise missiles from the previous question. No single weapon system is likely to decisively tilt the balance of power towards either side.