EU Autumn Challenges: Russian Assets, Ukraine, Moldova Paths, And Georgia's Backsliding

The European Union is on the beach for most of August. No European Parliament plenary sessions, council meetings, or committee gatherings. In short, nothing much is discussed, let alone decided on these weeks.

But as soon as the diplomats and officials are back in their offices in September, there are potential tough decisions to be taken and dilemmas to face this autumn. RFE/RL looks at five things to watch for in the upcoming months.

Unfreeze Russian Assets?

There are over 200 billion euros ($233 billion) worth of Russian assets in the European Union that have been frozen since the bloc started imposing sanctions on Moscow in February 2022 for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The debate inside the club has been raging ever since about what to do with the cash.

This debate will continue when EU foreign ministers meet in Denmark on August 29-30 for an informal gathering, known as Gymnich, which often serves as the opening act of the EU autumn.

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas has flagged that she wants a thorough debate during the two days on what the plan with the cash really is because it offers the bloc both a very potent bargaining chip in the future, even though it comes attached with some legal dilemmas.

Many EU member states, notably several hawkish ones in the east, want to seize the cash as soon as possible to pay for either weapons heading to Ukraine or re-arm the bloc.

The arguments are that this could cover the potential shortfall in US spending on Ukraine and that it is only fair that Russian money is used for weapons, as opposed to asking European taxpayers to foot the bill.

Others, notably the bigger member states, aren't too keen on seizing the cash quite yet. Some officials argue the money will be Europe's ticket into peace or cease-fire negotiations as Moscow is angling to get as much of the funds back as it can.

Others point out that it could be used as leverage against the Kremlin to cooperate with a new war tribunal. They also believe it is better to keep the assets frozen until the fighting ends and then use them to help pay for Ukraine's reconstruction.

Then, of course, there are fears inside the European Central Bank (ECB) about what a seizure of sovereign assets would do to the euro as a world currency as it may spook other countries from investing in the Euro area.

Belgium, home of the central securities depository Euroclear -- which holds most of the Russian cash -- is also wary of unilateral action. The argument from the Belgians is that the frozen assets are like a "golden goose" as the windfall profits from them, amounting 1 billion to 2 billion euros each quarter, would go directly to Kyiv's coffers. Expect the debate to rage on this for some time still.

Separating Moldova and Ukraine?

So far, Moldova and Ukraine have gone toward EU membership hand in hand. They were both granted candidate status in 2022 and, in late 2023, EU member states agreed that accession talks with the pair should commence.

Most European diplomats fully expected that the first of the 33 accession chapters would have been opened with both Chisinau and Kyiv in the first half of this year. But nothing has happened, as Hungary blocks the start of these negotiations due to what Budapest sees as a lack of rights for the Hungarian-speaking minority in Ukraine.

As Moldova and Ukraine are "coupled" so far, this blockage affects Chisinau as well. This spring there were talks about de-coupling the two countries so that at least Moldova could move ahead, but no consensus could be found.

Hungary has indicated it won't budge on this issue, notably after a nonbinding referendum earlier this year in which 95 percent of the respondents were opposed to Ukraine joining the bloc. Most EU officials now believe this position won't change until Hungarian parliamentary elections in April 2026.

At the same time, Moldova will hold an election on September 28 with the pro-EU government fighting to be re-elected. There are persistent rumors in Brussels that Ukraine and its many supporters in the club reluctantly have accepted a decoupling in which Moldova is allowed to advance alone for the time being.

Such a decision could come in early September to potentially tip the balance in favor of pro-EU forces in the Moldovan election.

Georgia On Their Minds

Brussels will continue to grapple with Georgia's backsliding this autumn -- possibly finally making some long-awaited decisions.

The European Commission sent a letter to the Georgian government in July asking it to comply by the end of August with eight benchmarks the Brussels executive arm set out in late 2024, including the need to repeal the controversial "transparency of foreign influence" law and the equally contested legislative package on "family values and protection of minors."

Few in Brussels expect Tbilisi to move much on these issues, setting up the question as to how the EU will respond -- and if so, when?

Sanctions on ruling Georgian Dream officials, as well as judges seen as responsible for targeting the opposition and demonstrators, have not materialized as Hungary and Slovakia have blocked them and are expected to do so again.

Therefore, work is under way in Brussels to potentially suspend Georgia's visa liberalization with the bloc. For this, only a qualified majority -- 55 percent of member states representing 65 percent of the EU's total population -- of member states is needed and this qualified majority seems to be in place.

It would be the first time ever the EU has suspended visa liberalization with a candidate country, but Brussels is clearly drawing up the necessary legal framework for this to happen.

The bloc could also suspend parts of the EU-Georgia association agreement this autumn, including its free trade aspects. The question is when this all can happen?

EU foreign ministers aren't officially meeting in any official council format until late October, potentially giving Tbilisi more time to respond to the demands. By then, Georgia will have held local elections (October 4), which will be another indicator as to where the South Caucasus republic is heading.

Entry/Exit Roll-Out

It should have happened already last year. And the year before that.

But on October 12, it will actually start: The EU's Entry/Exit System (EES) will be rolled out. This is significant for all non-EU nationals traveling into 24 EU countries taking part (all the member states apart from Cyprus and Ireland, with Denmark potentially opting into the system later) and four non-EU countries (Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein).

EES will do away with the manual stamping of passports and is meant to give way to an elaborate IT system at every international airport, harbor, and land-crossing that records entries, exits, fingerprints and facial images.

The roll-out will be gradual over the next six months with many EU member states that are home to big international travel hubs fearing a collapse if there was a big-bang introduction all at once. The IT system was for a long time not believed to be completely solid, but EU officials are now confident that everything finally will work.

If the EES roll-out is complete in the first quarter of 2026, one can also assume that ETIAS (the European Travel and Authorization System) will be launched later that same year as the two systems are linked. ETIAS is the EU equivalent of the United States' Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) and will have a big impact on all travelers that come to the EU visa free.

An estimated 1.4 billion people, including citizens of Britain, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, the United States, and the non-EU Western Balkan states, will need this authorization before entering the bloc for the first time. Valid for three years, it will cost 7 euros.

V4 Back With A Vengeance?

There aren't too many elections in Europe this autumn, which is something of a rarity. Yes, Moldova holds a crucial vote in September (see above) and there is a snap election in the Netherlands in late October in which the populist right-wing PVV might finish on top but is likely to see a surging center-left/green coalition form a government instead.

Perhaps the most interesting vote will be in the Czech Republic on October 3-4. All polls indicate that the populist Andrej Babis will return to power.

The main issue to watch is if his ANO party will govern alone, with the support of even more radical forces to the left and right on the political spectrum, or if any parties in the current pro-European government coalition will lend him support.

And that will in turn determine what type of Czech Republic will show up on the European scene.

But what's clear is that Slovakia's Robert Fico and Hungary's Viktor Orban most likely will welcome a like-minded partner in Prague.

As the populist Karol Nawrocki recently sworn in as president in Poland with the expectation of blocking a lot of the legislation of the more liberal Premier Donald Tusk is proposing, rumors are swirling in Warsaw that his government there might collapse soon as well and give way to a return of the conservative Law and Justice Party.

Emerging from all this is a pretty like-minded Visegrad Four (V4) again. The block of the four Central European countries has played a big role in shaping EU policies for many years but due to political differences among the capitals in recent times, V4 was very much a dormant concept.

Now, it could be one to watch again.

Sure, there are still differences, not at least when it comes to relations with Russia, and Warsaw is still something of an outlier as Tusk is expected to soldier on. But if Babis re-emerges with a clear popular mandate this autumn, you will have three Central European capitals with a clear skeptic attitude toward both Brussels and Kyiv.

This might, of course, change again when Hungary votes in a much-anticipated parliamentary election the spring of 2026. But at a crucial moment in Europe, the Visegrad countries can prove to throw plenty of curveballs in the near term.