Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.
I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two issues: Ukraine and Moldova joining the EU’s mobile roaming area & a big legal win for the EU against sanctioned Russian oligarchs.
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Wider Europe Briefing: Ukraine, Moldova To Join EU’s Mobile Roaming Zone
Briefing #1: Ukraine, Moldova Move A Step Closer To EU By Joining Bloc's Roaming Area
What You Need To Know: Ukraine and Moldova are set to take a major symbolic step toward European Union membership by joining the bloc's "roam like at home" (RLAH) mobile phone regime on January 1, 2026. One of the EU's more popular policies since it began in 2017, RLAH allows people who have a mobile contract in one EU member state to be charged domestic rates for calls, text messages, and data when visiting another country in the club. The RLAH is also applicable in the other non-EU countries of the European Economic Area -- Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway -- as well as other states in which some telecom operators have decided to align with EU legislation, like the United Kingdom. But this move is the first time Brussels has invited EU candidate countries to join this part of its single market.
Deep Background: The For Ukraine, this move is not entirely unexpected, nor is it something completely new. When the full-scale invasion of Ukraine occurred in 2022, the bloc's operators, in cooperation with several Ukrainian counterparts, struck a deal allowing Ukrainian refugees in the EU to benefit from either roaming free or very low costs while using their Ukrainian mobile phones. This benefit has been prolonged on numerous occasions by the EU since, most recently in July last year via a qualified majority (55 percent of the member states comprising 65 percent of the total EU population). In fact, EU diplomats have described this measure as one of the easiest to agree on among themselves, unlike other Ukraine-related policies such as the removal of trade barriers for Ukrainian goods coming into the bloc. Ukraine will now become a permanent member of the RLAH regime, with a final decision expected by the other members in July. A transition period is expected to be agreed upon until January 1, 2026, to make sure everything goes smoothly. During that transition period a final prolongation of the temporary roam like home provision will also be agreed on in July. Moldova, which also is expected to join Ukraine in the RLAH area by early next year, doesn't enjoy the same temporary roaming measures as Ukrainians in the EU do, but since last year Moldovan and EU operators have gradually and voluntarily lowered telecom costs.
Drilling Down:
- Ukraine and Moldova are able to join RLAH because of an opening in the association agreement that both countries struck with the EU in the past decade. These agreements provided for what is called "mutual internal market treatment" for a product or a service such as roaming.
- This means that if Kyiv and/or Chisinau complies with all EU legislation for that product or service and the EU is happy with the implementation of the laws, they would be part of the EU's internal market in that specific area.
- EU hopefuls in the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia) don't have this in their respective association agreements with Brussels because they were inked much earlier than those for the EU's eastern neighbors. Instead, the six Balkan nations created a specific "roam like home" policy among themselves with the aim of gradually reducing tariffs vis-a-vis the EU.
- Since last year both Ukraine and Moldova have introduced various EU roaming and telecom legislation. Some relates to technical standards, networks, and pricing, while other legislation addresses practical things like the number of masts and transmitters.
- Ukraine's parliament adopted the final necessary bill in this respect in April, and the European Commission received the final notification that all the laws had been published on June 6. It will soon recommend that EU member states vote in favor of Kyiv joining full time.
- Moldova, on the other hand, is a few weeks behind Ukraine, but the commission hopes to be notified of all the necessary legislative changes by the end of this month.
- While these measures in general are positive for consumers, there is no doubt that both Moldovan and Ukrainian mobile operators will lose out financially, just like EU operators did when RLAH was first introduced. And while the changes have been gradual, operators will likely compensate for their losses by raising charges for consumers in other areas.
- There will also be questions around what territory the RLAH policy actually covers when it comes to Moldova and Ukraine. Moldova's Transnistria should be covered, and there could be parts of the Russian-occupied Donbas where it works, but Kyiv has lost many transmitters due to the fighting and Crimea -- annexed by Russia in 2014 -- is now completely covered by the Russian telecom network.
Briefing #2: EU Sanctions Score A Legal Win Over Russian Oligarchs
What You Need To Know: The European Union scored an important legal victory over Russia with its sanctions policy on June 5 as the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Luxembourg issued an opinion stating that visa bans and asset freezes of five prominent Russian businessmen deemed closed to the Kremlin are not only lawful but also Brussels doesn't need to prove their ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin's regime. Following the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the EU blacklisted the five Russians -- Dmitry Pumpyanskiy, Dmitry Mazepin, Tigran Khudaverdyan, Viktor Rashnikov, and German Khan -- and accused them of undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the war-torn country. The quintet, together with up to 80 other sanctioned Russians and Belarusians, petitioned the ECJ to be removed from the black list on various grounds. The cases were dismissed in 2023, and the judges at the time noted they that all five held high positions in the Russian economy, and that those sectors provided a substantial source of revenue for the Kremlin.
Deep Background: They all appealed the court's initial ruling, and before the final verdict, one of the court's Advocate Generals was requested to deliver an opinion on their appeals. This opinion isn't binding on the court, but in most cases the court rules in line with the opinion. In this case, given the clear view the Advocate General delivered, a ruling could come as early as July or after the EU court's summer recess in August. The impending ruling is also likely the end of the road for the quintet's legal quest in the EU's court system to get their sanctions removed. Given that other Russian businessmen have made similar appeals to be delisted, it's fair to assume not many will be successful going forward.
Drilling Down:
- The opinion sets a sort of precedent and spells out one thing: The legal framework for the bloc's Russia sanctions policy appears solid.
- The opinion states clearly that there is "a rational relationship" between sanctioning leading businesspeople who provide a substantial revenue to the Russian government and the objective of the restrictive measures.
- The objective is stated clearly: to "exert pressure on the Government of the Russian Federation to put an end to aggression of Russia in Ukraine by reducing the financial resources available." By sanctioning businessmen in the country, the economy is harmed, and thus it increases the cost of waging war against Kyiv.
- The key thing in the opinion, however, is that when imposing these sanctions the EU doesn't have to prove "any specific conduct of the listed person, in particular in terms of influence over the Russian Government." This is what the sanctioned people in essence wanted to appeal: that while they are economically active in Russia, they have no direct sway on government policy when it comes to the war in Ukraine.
- It now appears sufficient to produce general links with Putin to clear the legal hurdle. When the EU decided to sanction leading Russian businessmen, they referred to a meeting organized by Putin a few days after the Ukrainian full-scale invasion with almost 40 of the most economically influential Russians to discuss the impact of the course of action in the wake of Western sanctions.
- There are other reasons, too, that Brussels lists these five. In Pumpyanskiy's case, the EU noted he participated in the congress of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs in March 2023, in which Putin urged participants to put "patriotism before profit."
- German Khan is one of the owners of Alfa Bank, and the bloc notes that Putin's eldest daughter, Maria, ran a charity project called Alfa-Endo that was funded by the bank.
- Both Mazepin and Rashnikov are listed because their businesses provide "substantial resources of revenue to the state budget," whereas Tigran Khudaverdyan, executive director of one of Russia's leading technology companies Yandex, is blacklisted because the company "has been warning Russian users looking for news about Ukraine on its search engine of unreliable information on the Internet."
- The ECJ ruling comes as a sigh of relief for the EU, which has faced some hurdles. It was battered in the same court for sanctions imposed on former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych and his entourage in 2014 for the "misappropriation of Ukrainian state funds." The sanctions were based on rather flimsy evidence and have since largely collapsed.
- Brussels was also slapped on the wrist for the current Russia sanctions, notably restrictive measures on relatives of listed businessmen. Both Nikita Mazepin, the racing driving son of Dmitry Mazepin, and Violeta Prigozhina, the mother of the late Russian oligarch and Wagner mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, have won in the Luxembourg court and have since been delisted.
Looking Ahead
Globesec will host its annual forum in Prague on June 12-14. Central and Eastern Europe''s biggest think-tank event brings together politicians, analysts and diplomats from all over Europe and beyond for plenty of insights and discussions on the most pressing security issues. I will be there for all three days -- please read more about it in next week's newsletter.
That's all for this week!
Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.
Until next time,
Rikard Jozwiak
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