Ilan Berman is senior vice president of the American Foreign Policy Council and a veteran national-security policy adviser for the Department of Defense, Congress, and US government agencies. He also recently served as head of the team handling the United States Agency for Global Media (USAGM) transition on behalf of President Donald Trump's administration, and is a board member of RFE/RL.
In a conversation with Hannah Kaviani of RFE/RL's Radio Farda, Berman, a leading expert on the Middle East, spoke about the rapidly evolving situation in Iran and the US role in the conflict five days after Israel's surprise attack opened a new chapter in the confrontation between the two countries.
RFE/RL: Did something change in President Trump's mind (since the start of the conflict)?
Ilan Berman: I don't think so, at least not yet. The way I see the current US policy is: It is escalating to de-escalate. President Trump, in the past, has made very clear that his optimal end state is for this regime to come to the negotiating table and really make meaningful concessions with regard to its nuclear program.
He became increasingly frustrated in recent days because it was clear that the Iranian regime was just playing for time, that they weren't really in good faith negotiating about the nuclear program. They were basically just running out the clock.
RFE/RL: But they still had plans to meet on Sunday (June 15), right?
Berman: Well, yes, and it's not clear to me whether that was an authentic plan or that was just floated even though the White House knew that the Israelis were going to strike before them.
But what I see as being important now is that the president still wants a deal.
What Israel has done, at least so far, has really advantaged the possibility that Iran will come to the table and will make meaningful concessions. I think that's still the goal of the Trump administration's policy.
But in order for that objective to be reached, Trump has to have a credible threat of escalation, and I would argue that's why you're seeing this significant movement of military assets into the Middle East, because there is another way that this can go if the Iranian regime does not, does not acquiesce and does not return to the negotiating table.
I think the president is prepared to assist Israel in attacking Fordow and other sites, but I don't think that's his first preference.
RFE/RL: President Trump uses very much the word surrender. Why? Why do you think he's using this term? And what do you think it means to him -- this word?
Berman: Well, and then obviously it's a loaded word, and I don't think it is surrender the way it's interpreted in the Middle East, which has to do with state honor or familial honor.
I think what he's doing is he's very clearly articulating how he sees Iran's current position, because after four or five days of Israel's campaign, the Iranian regime is very much on the back foot militarily.
I think President Trump sees this. If the Iranian regime returns to the negotiating table, it's not going to be a negotiation between equals. It's going to be much more about what meaningful concessions Iran can make that he's going to be satisfied with.
RFE/RL: There is a lot of talk out there. I think I saw it one of your own pieces as well, the issue of the existence and the fate of Islamic republic as a system as a whole. And there is a lot of talk that, if this is really the end game here or not, I want to see what you think about it. Is regime change on the table?
Berman: I don't think so, at least not yet. And I say this advisedly, because I'm a big believer in the fact that the Islamic republic is a corrupt system, and that the Iranian people have made very clear that they want something else, but I don't think that's in the cards right now, at least on the part of Israel and the United States.
Israel has made very clear that regime change is not on the table in the current phase of its military campaign, and the Trump administration, at least for now, would much prefer, as I see it, would much prefer a deal with the existing regime than a change of regime.
RFE/RL: But what is this regime change? Can we elaborate a bit? Because what does it mean that it's not on the cards? What is regime change in this meaning, like, how would Israel or the US have regime change in mind?
Berman: So, there's the sort of the old Iraq model of externally imposed regime change. I don't think either Israel or the United States has any appetite for that.
But I think there are things that both countries can do that would advantage or create advantages for opposition forces acting from within.
And Israel has done a small number of them already. It has attacked the Basij (a paramilitary force linked to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards) headquarters. It has bombed the Intelligence Ministry. And these things are, I think, intended to create an opening for Iranians to take matters into their own hands.
But is there a serious Israeli or American push to support the Iranian opposition and to sort of to encourage them and sustain them if and when they rise up? I don't think we're seeing that yet.
RFE/RL: People are asking, observers are asking, how would Iranians take matters in their own hands when they're running for their lives?
Berman: That's a fair question. Look, I think the problem that we Westerners have when we think about regime change in Iran is that we really have been unserious about investing in the potential for change within Iran.
We talk a lot about regime change, but we haven't really invested in a campaign to expand communications, to create a strike fund, to do all these different things that would allow the Iranian opposition the room to breathe, the room to organize and to mobilize against the regime.
That's, I think, a huge problem, and I think that's a necessary prerequisite for Iranians to really feel confident enough to rise up in a sustained fashion.
