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US Ambassador to NATO Matthew Whitaker (left) and European Union foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas attend a meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group in Brussels on April 11.
US Ambassador to NATO Matthew Whitaker (left) and European Union foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas attend a meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group in Brussels on April 11.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on one thing: my take from Tallinn and the road ahead.

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The Briefing: From Tallinn To The Hague: The Run-Up To The NATO Summit

On May 13, a Russian military jet violated Estonian and NATO territory for close to a minute after the Estonian Navy made an attempt to intercept a flag-less tanker, named Jaguar, thought to belong to the Kremlin's so-called shadow fleet transporting EU-sanctioned oil to and from Russia. The Sukhoi Su-35 was deployed to protect the vessel that later returned to the Russian port of Primorsk.

The incident was the first reported breach of Estonia's airspace since 2022 and somewhat indirectly set the tone for the Lennart Meri conference in Tallinn on May 16-18.

The Baltic state's largest annual think tank event was full of Western officials putting on a brave face when discussing the state of the war in Ukraine, Russian threats to the rest of the continent, and the United States' increasingly thorny relations with Europe.

The American Presence In Europe

Perhaps the most eagerly anticipated appearance was that of Matthew Whitaker, US President Donald Trump's newly appointed ambassador to NATO, especially with so many worries, notably in eastern flank countries like Estonia, over American commitment to the military alliance.

Seemingly hanging on to every word he said, most people in the room appeared relieved that he ticked most boxes. Yes, NATO is "the greatest alliance in world history." And yes, Russia is the security threat to the organization. He seemed to comprehend the argument, put to him by Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski, that if the Europeans will splash the cash on the defense, quite a lot of it will be spent on European arms companies as Europeans also have an electorate and workforce to satisfy.

Refusing to be drawn into discussion about his boss's designs on Greenland, he simply noted that Denmark, which the giant island belongs to, is "a great NATO ally" but that bilateral relations weren't his responsibility.

Then there was the whole issue of the American force posture review, which will happen in the latter half of the year. There is plenty of speculation among diplomats that Washington will cut down on troops in Europe and boost its presence in the Indo-Pacific theater instead.

Whitaker noted that nothing had been determined yet and that allies will be consulted on the process. He also promised everything would be orderly, meaning the United States would "ensure that there are no security gaps."

Did that reassure nervous NATO members bordering Russia? Not really, but those diplomats I spoke to were still defiant, pointing out that the United States could also remove soldiers from the western part of the continent to the eastern one as it's cheaper to maintain their presence there and it offers good exercise conditions.

Another one tried to sound reassuring by arguing that the US flag -- meaning any presence -- was still better than the actual number of boots on the ground.

The Hague (No) Show?

Otherwise much of the discussion in Estonia focused on the upcoming NATO summit at The Hague at the end of June. While the previous two summits, in Vilnius back in 2023 and Washington a year later, were all about Ukraine and the haggling about whether Kyiv should get a NATO membership invite and how to phrase the country's eventual path into the club, the war-torn country will now be almost absent from the discussions.

There is still not even confirmation that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy will be invited to the Netherlands after being the star guest at previous gatherings.

Whitaker did, however, note that he expected him to be present. The Estonian foreign minister, Margus Tsahkna, pointed out that it would be "a major stratcom mistake" if he didn't come as that would be all the media would write about from the gathering.

But forget any invitations or any other language on Ukraine's future place in the alliance, especially since Trump has seemingly ruled out Kyiv joining anytime soon. In fact, Ukraine may not be mentioned at all in the final summit declaration.

One European official told me it's probably better for now as any attempts to negotiate about it would probably make the text worse for Ukraine than the 2024 Washington summit declaration, which at least states that NATO "will continue to support it on its irreversible path to full Euro-Atlantic integration, including NATO membership."

The same dilemma is true for any wording on Russia, so Moscow simply might not be mentioned at all. In fact, the entire text might just be a few paragraphs, compared to nearly 40 from last year that covered all manner of topics.

Instead, the summit, which now has been shortened from three to two days, will focus on ramping up European defense spending and building up a transatlantic defense industrial base, according to NATO Deputy Secretary-General Radmila Sekerinska.

The main headline will be the commitment by the 32 allies to reach 5 percent of GDP on defense spending, up from the current target of 2 percent. They should also dedicate 3.5 percent to "hard targets" such as arms and artillery, and the remaining 1.5 percent to cyberdefense, investment in military mobility, and the like.

But of course, all eyes will be on Trump, both in the Netherlands and in the run-up. Despite the fact that the much-hyped first direct Russia-Ukraine meeting in three years in Ankara last week turned into a lower-level nothing burger in which Moscow only repeated its "maximalist" positions of land grabs and Ukrainian neutrality, most people in Tallinn still cautiously think a cease-fire of some sort is possible in the run-up to the NATO summit.

Trump, Putin, Cease-Fire

The expectation is that Trump and Putin will eventually meet. They spoke on the phone once again on May 19, but there are clear European fears about what Trump might agree to in such a setting.

No one I spoke to believes Trump is truly serious about imposing hard-hitting measures on the Kremlin. Republican lawmaker Lindsey Graham proposed imposing 500 percent tariffs on countries that buy Russian oil, and there has been talk of other "secondary sanctions" hitting countries like Belgium, the Netherlands, and Spain, which import a lot of Russian liquefied natural gas.

I also sensed a fear among officials that reestablishing US-Russia bilateral relations, including striking some sort of trade and investment deal, is more important to both sides than actually having a lasting peace deal in Ukraine. The almost universal assessment I heard is that Putin is playing "the long game" over Ukraine, and while the Ukrainian lines won't breach anytime soon, he thinks he is winning. Or as one official put it: "Ukraine and Russia are in fact both losing, but Russia is losing more slowly."

This all puts Europe in a bind. I've heard Paris is mulling reestablishing a direct line with the Kremlin. "The Americans cannot be the only ones speaking to them," as one official put it. But no official meeting with Moscow is in the making.

When asked at a panel discussion whether it was time to have another NATO-Russia Council (NRC), a dormant political format since 2022, the answer from both Tsahkna and Sikorski was an emphatic "no" with the latter adding: "It was an instrument in times of peace which limited troops in eastern flank states. As long as Putin is president, we cannot trust that country."

More Sanctions?

So, Europe will continue to push for more sanctions for now. Its 17th package, probably the bloc's puniest yet, will be officially agreed on May 20, and there is already work on the next one, which will contain more blacklistings, including both Russian entities and individuals but also vessels thought to belong to the shadow fleet.

There might also be sanctions against more Russian banks and against Nordsteam 1 and 2, which are no longer operational but still aren't officially targeted. There is also a desire from the Europeans for the Group of Seven summit in Canada next month to lower the oil price cap for Russia from the current $60 per barrel to at least $50.

However, EU officials I spoke to don't believe all of the measures will pass, notably as Hungary can continue to be a spoiler. Most are also worried that the sanctions rollover in July will still be a proper struggle with alternative solutions being studied, for example, not to allow Russian frozen assets in the bloc to expire.

The Dilemma

But the threat from Russia will still be there. And the Europeans, while saying they're ready to stand up to Moscow even without American help, are wary.

The reassurance force meant for Ukraine once there is a cease-fire probably won't be particularly reassuring. European army officials have admitted they lack the long-strike capabilities of the United States and notably its supreme intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.

And time is short. An assessment earlier this year from the Danish intelligence service claimed Russia could be capable of starting a major war in Europe (outside of Ukraine) within five years. But the Europeans might have to be ready well before that. Onno Eichelsheim, chief of defense for the Netherlands armed forces, told the Lennart Meri conference crowd that "Russia can give us 'a dilemma' already within a year after a potential end of the fighting in Ukraine."

What that dilemma might be, he didn't specify. But as Estonia experienced with the airspace violation earlier in the week, all options appear to be on the table.

Looking Ahead

EU enlargement is stuck for Ukraine and Moldova as well as most candidate countries in the Western Balkans for various political reasons. But there is one country that appears to be rapidly marching toward Brussels and EU membership right now: Albania.

On May 22, the country will start negotiations on another eight EU accession chapters (there are 33 in total), and it comes just a month after it opened another batch of chapters. The key going forward for Tirana will be to actually close negotiations on these chapters, which is much harder than opening them.

Feel free to reach out to me on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

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A poster depicting Russian President Vladimir Putin is seen behind an EU flag during a rally by the Czech Republic's Ukrainian community following Russia's invasion of Crimea, in Prague in 2014.
A poster depicting Russian President Vladimir Putin is seen behind an EU flag during a rally by the Czech Republic's Ukrainian community following Russia's invasion of Crimea, in Prague in 2014.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's new newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two issues: The EU's latest raft of sanctions against Russia and the EPC summit in Tirana.

Briefing #1: The EU's New Sanctions On Russia

What You Need To Know: The European Union's latest proposal for the next round of sanctions on Russia -- the 17th package since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine over three years ago -- might just be its weakest yet.

Presented by the European Commission earlier this week to the 27 EU member and seen by RFE/RL, the proposal contains no hard-hitting economic measures against the Kremlin. Instead, it features more asset freezes and visa bans on various individuals and entities, mostly Russian citizens and companies involved in the arms industry.

It also includes banning 98 more ships from Moscow's so-called shadow fleet from being serviced at EU ports, bringing the total of ships on the list to 250. And lastly, it imposes export restrictions on 35 companies, most of which are Russian but others are Kazakh, Serbian, Turkish, and Uzbek.

Deep Background: The goal, according to EU officials RFE/RL has spoken to, is to adopt the proposal when the bloc's foreign ministers meet on May 20.

The club wants to show that Russia's numerous attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure in recent weeks shouldn't go unpunished, and approval is also likely to be swift -- the new measures are so uncontroversial that even a sanctions skeptic like Hungary would be ready to give a ready thumbs-up.

According to diplomats familiar with the sanctions negotiations, Budapest will, however, request a certain proposed entity be scrubbed off the list. It's the Dubai-based Litasco, a subsidiary of the Russian energy giant Lukoil. Hungary is one of the very few EU countries still importing Russian oil.

Brussels wants to target the company as it has "enabled the procurement of numerous vessels forming part of the so-called shadow fleet," according to the proposal. "These vessels have transported oil from Russia while turning off or manipulating their AIS transponders, not maintaining adequate liability insurance or other financial security, as well as carrying out unsafe maritime operations."

There are also questions about whether blacklisting six proposed Chinese companies will fly given that some European capitals are wary of upsetting Beijing too much given the extensive trade links between Brussels and China. The most interesting of these are Poly Technologies, which has provided components for Russian military helicopters, and Skywalker Technology, a producer of the Gerbera drone that Brussels says "has been used by the Russian military in Ukraine, in particular as a decoy drone to overwhelm Ukrainian defense systems."

Drilling Down:

• While this package seems insignificant, the EU has been working on separate sanctions measures targeting Russia in parallel to the 17th package. These are more thematic sanctions consisting of asset freezes and visa bans, and are set to be adopted later in May. These include blacklistings for human rights abuses, the use of chemical weapons, and "destabilizing activities" carried out around the world.

• The human rights violation package targets 28 people, all Russian judges and prosecutors, who are responsible for either targeting the deceased Russian opposition politician Aleksei Navalny and his associates or for sentencing Russians for spreading anti-war messages online.

• The chemical weapons proliferation listings target three entities, including the Radiological Chemical and Biological Defense Troops of the Russian Defense Ministry. In its reasoning, the EU is for the first time formally accusing the Kremlin of using chemical weapons on the battlefield in Ukraine.

• The proposal also targets 21 individuals and companies for destabilizing activities around the world. These include two people accused of being behind attacks on vehicles of the Estonian interior minister and the editor of a Russian-language newspaper in Tallinn.

• Others include Elena Kolbasnikova, a Russian national accused of creating "political structures with the German anti-democratic extreme political right in support of Russia's destabilization of Ukraine," Alina Lipp, a war correspondent with the Russian armed forces in eastern Ukraine, and German blogger Thomas Roper, who "disseminates misinformation about Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and delegitimizes the Ukrainian government."

• Two targeted Moldovan nationals, Ivan and Iurie Neculiti, run a Web hosting service registered in the United Kingdom called Stark, which reportedly enables "various Russian state-sponsored and affiliated actors to conduct destabilizing activities including coordinated information manipulation and interference and cyber-attacks against EU and third countries."

• There are also a handful of people who allegedly spread Russian propaganda in various African countries and a Russian fishing company, Murman SeaFood. This company is the owner of a vessel that according to the EU "has repeatedly shown untypical behavior and navigation practices inconsistent with their normal fishing activities, including presence in close vicinity to an ongoing NATO military exercise and regular presence close to Norwegian critical infrastructure and military sites."

Briefing #2: Why Europe's Leaders Are Gathering In Tirana This Week

What You Need To Know: On May 16, leaders from all over Europe are gathering on Skanderbeg Square in central Tirana for the European Political Community (EPC) summit. The EPC, an idea conceived by the French President Emmanuel Macron as a direct response to the war in Ukraine, meets at the highest level twice a year with the host rotating between the 27 EU member states and the 20 non-EU countries.

Now it's Albania's turn, and the event will be something of a crowning achievement for Prime Minister Edi Rama. In power since 2013, he is already one of the most experienced operators in the room, and the meeting comes just five days after a general election in the Western Balkan republic in which his socialist party will finish on top yet again.

Brussels holds Rama in high esteem, with EU officials praising him for his diplomatic skills and sharp wit. A reflection of this is the fact that Albania, within a year, has opened a majority of the EU accession chapters and is set to open some more by the end of this month.

Deep Background: The EPC is not an EU vehicle, nor is it a substitute for EU membership as some EU hopefuls fear. Essentially it's a forum for talking shop that doesn't officially produce any concrete deliverables or final communique; it has no permanent seat or secretariat.

While media representatives are struggling to explain what sort of animal it is and what purpose it serves given there are so many other European institutions (such as the Council of Europe and OSCE, to name a few) leaders appear to love attending its summits.

This is largely because there is minimal official choreography compared to, for example, NATO and EU summits, which follow strict protocols. Sure, there's an opening ceremony, a plenary session. and a family photo. Leaders are then divided into three thematic roundtables focusing on security, competitiveness, and migration.

Most of the one-day gathering, however, will be devoted to various planned and spontaneous bilateral meetings that can quickly turn into larger meetings if needed. It happens without too many accredited aides and advisers, meaning a lot of diplomatic speed-dating and huddles in a nice setting with plenty to eat and drink. It offers "a little bit of freedom and creativity in their otherwise structured lives" as one diplomat put it to me.

Drilling Down:

• At previous EPC summits, there were a political push to have Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders meet, often together with the French and German leaders, but it is my understanding that no such attempts will be made this time around even though it can never be ruled out.

• Who's coming? So far, I've been told no one has declined the invitation that went out to all European nations bar Belarus, Russia, and the Vatican. The three presidents of the European Council, Commission, and Parliament will attend, as will NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte.

• This will be German Chancellor Friedrich Merz's first multilateral meeting, as well. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is expected to show up even if it's not confirmed till the last minute, and Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan is also expected to come after having skipped some of the previous EPC summits.

• Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze is invited, as he was to the last one in Budapest in November. EU diplomats are keen to point out that the Tirana meeting is EPC and not the EU, consider the latter has a policy not to engage with high-level Georgian officials after the contested Georgian parliamentary elections last October. If Kobakhidze shows up, it will be interesting to see how EU leaders react.

• In a similar vein, it will be worth watching how leaders interact with Serbian President Alexander Vucic and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico as both attended the Victory Day parade in Moscow on May 9, rubbing shoulders with Vladimir Putin.

• Fico is largely isolated on the EU level even though no types of sanctions or punishment are in the making after his Moscow trip. Brussels warned Vucic not to make the journey to Russia, noting that as an official candidate country Serbia should align with the bloc's foreign policies.

• Vucic looks set to get away with it though. A senior EU official confirmed at a background briefing ahead of the Tirana summit that Serbia will remain a candidate country and there's no consensus among member states to impose sanctions on the country.

• The only consequence will be that Serbia won't advance on its EU accession path -- something that is rather moot anyway as the Balkan republic hasn't opened a single negotiating chapter in the past four years.

Looking Ahead

It is a big week for NATO. On May 14, the chiefs of defense of the military alliance's 32 members meet in Brussels for their last session before the NATO summit at The Hague next month.

Support for Ukraine and NATO missions, operations, and defense plans will all be top of the agenda. On the same day but in the Turkish seaside resort of Antalya, Rutte will gather NATO foreign ministers for an informal two-day meeting. The gathering is controversial given Turkey's repressive policies against the opposition, notably the recent jailing of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu.

That's all for this week!

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

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About The Newsletter

The Wider Europe newsletter briefs you every Tuesday morning on key issues concerning the EU, NATO, and other institutions’ relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe’s Eastern neighborhoods.

For more than a decade as a correspondent in Brussels, Rikard Jozwiak covered all the major events and crises related to the EU’s neighborhood and how various Western institutions reacted to them -- the war in Georgia, the annexation of Crimea, Russia’s support for separatists in eastern Ukraine, the downing of MH17, dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, the EU and NATO enlargement processes in the Western Balkans, as well as visa liberalizations, free-trade deals, and countless summits.

Now out of the “Brussels bubble,” but still looking in -- this time from the heart of Europe, in Prague -- he continues to focus on the countries where Brussels holds huge sway, but also faces serious competition from other players, such as Russia and, increasingly, China.

To subscribe, click here.

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