Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.
I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two major issues: potential Georgia sanctions and Ukraine’s setback on EU and NATO membership.
Briefing #1: Is The EU Now Ready To Sanction Georgia?
What You Need To Know: After months of simmering tensions in the country, Georgia is slowly moving up the EU’s agenda again, driven by a wave of arrests of opposition figures and new restrictive laws such as the Foreign Agent Registration Act and changes to broadcasting regulations.
For much of the past year, the EU has struggled to form a clear strategy toward the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) government, particularly after it claimed victory in last year’s disputed parliamentary elections amid allegations of irregularities.
Earlier this year, Brussels imposed visa requirements on holders of Georgian diplomatic passports and refrained from holding high-level meetings while attempting to divert some funding away from the government and toward civil society instead.
However, stronger measures -- like EU sanctions on GD leaders -- were blocked, especially by Hungary and Slovakia, in early 2025.
Deep Background: Could things be different now?
EU foreign ministers briefly discussed the situation in Georgia when they assembled in Brussels on June 23 and they agreed to come back to the issue again when they meet on July 15 ahead of the monthlong Brussels recess when little of note occurs in terms of policymaking in the bloc.
Prompting the recent June discussion was a one-page paper drafted by Lithuania, one of the EU’s more hawkish voices regarding Georgia’s current leadership.
Seen by RFE/RL, it proposes several measures that the club can enact as the situation in Georgia continues “to deteriorate drastically.”
While the discussion was rather short and came at the end of the meeting, several member states spoke out and seemed to agree that Brussels needs to do something more.
However, EU officials whom RFE/RL has spoken to under condition of anonymity did suggest it was very telling that Hungary argued that the bloc should pursue closer cooperation with Tbilisi.
Austria, while critical of the situation in the South Caucasus republic, also cautioned that it was important not to push it too much into Russia’s orbit.
Drilling Down
- So, what is Lithuania proposing? One of the six points is, of course, personal sanctions on Georgian Dream’s leadership. This will not fly due to Budapest’s objections, but EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas interestingly floated another sanctions idea when speaking to media after the meeting: to target judges that are responsible for sentencing the opposition and civil society members.
- While it’s hard to envisage unanimity on this, it should be noted that EU sanctions on Russia and Belarus several years ago started with asset freezes and visa bans on lower-profile people, such as judges, instead of well-known political players.
- Other suggestions in the paper allude to suspending all EU financial aid to Tbilisi, including “large-scale infrastructure projects.” These sorts of investments are often hard to just stop, however, especially since other countries in the region could be involved and the projects are already under way.
- Brussels is also exploring channeling more money to independent journalists, civil society groups, and dismissed Georgian diplomats and civil servants. But the reality is that the EU is trying to help a lot of organizations and countries worldwide in recent months after USAID scaled down its operations. The bloc will start discussions this summer on a new long-term budget beyond the current one, which runs out in 2027. But, right now, there isn’t too much spare cash available.
- Perhaps the two most interesting topics covered in the discussion paper are the suspension of visa liberalization and of the EU-Georgia association agreement. None of this will be easy to do, but there are a few things worth looking out for here.
- Removing visa liberalization for all Georgian citizens is something few want as it targets the general population. But the paper has floated the idea of setting a concrete deadline for Tbilisi to address shortcomings, notably around fundamental rights, as highlighted in a 2024 European Commission report on visa policies for third countries.
- It could be that visa suspension for certain categories of travelers could be forthcoming, especially since this only requires a qualified majority of member states (55 percent of countries representing 65 percent of the total EU population). The EU itself has also enacted rules making it easier to issue suspensions.
- Then there is the EU-Georgia association agreement, which has been in force since 2016. This regulates political and trade relations between Brussels and Tbilisi via the so-called Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area agreement (DCFTA), which is part of the general association agreement.
- The Lithuanian paper suggests the European Commission should examine whether Georgia is breaching the agreement, particularly Article 2, which covers fundamental principles like respect for human rights. A similar review was recently conducted on the EU-Israel association agreement, and Brussels found several breaches. Given this emerging trend in EU foreign policy, don’t be surprised if some member states push for a Georgia review as soon as July.
- Further down the line it is worth noting that unanimity is needed to suspend the entire association agreement, but suspending some areas could be easier. To put the trade aspects of the agreement on ice, for example, only requires a qualified majority.
Briefing #2: Ukraine's Difficult Week At The EU And NATO
What You Need To Know: Last week could have been a momentous week in Ukraine’s long-term wish of joining the European Union and NATO.
In the end, it wasn't.
As leaders of the two institutions met for key summits in Brussels and The Hague respectively, Kyiv’s eventual membership of both should have been a centerpiece.
Instead, Ukraine is no closer to joining either -- and the many obstacles in the war-torn country's path to the Euro-Atlantic community were on full display.
Rewind one year to NATO’s Washington summit.
Just like in Vilnius a year ago, Ukraine was frustrated that it didn’t get an invitation, but the final declaration gushed about the country.
“We fully support Ukraine’s right to choose its own security arrangements and decide its own future, free from outside interference. Ukraine’s future is in NATO,” the text reaffirmed, before adding “as Ukraine continues this vital work, we will continue to support it on its irreversible path to full Euro-Atlantic integration, including NATO membership.”
Joe Biden, the US president at the time, was reluctant to go further, with Kyiv engaged in direct conflict with Russia.
Germany was quietly backing Washington’s stance but the warm language and “the guest of honor” treatment of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the summit was indicative of an aspirant country that soon would transform to a full-fledged ally.
Deep Background: At this year’s NATO summit in The Hague, the scenes could not have been much starker.
Biden is no longer president. In his place is Donald Trump, who has openly dismissed Ukraine’s chances of joining for years.
And the new reality was on display everywhere.
There was no NATO-Ukraine Council on a leaders’ level. No one talked openly about Ukraine’s eventual membership and there were no words about it in the final declaration.
Instead, there was just a line that allies can count financial support to Kyiv as part of the military alliance’s new defense spending target.
Granted, Zelenskyy was present at the summit dinner. He met all relevant leaders, including a bilateral with Donald Trump that according to all read-outs went well.
Trump even said he was nice, opened up for potential Patriot deliveries to Ukraine, and seemed to show willingness to press Russian President Vladimir Putin to come to the table.
But, in reality, Ukraine got nothing concrete, niceties aside.
Washington is still reluctant to sanction Russia, the Europeans are shying away from their signature proposal to lower the Russian oil price cap, and when it comes to NATO membership, Kyiv is further away now than it was a year ago.
The fact that officials said it was a success that Trump didn’t treat Zelenskyy badly and that the Ukrainians didn’t complain about the lack of outcomes shows how low expectations were.
Drilling Down
- At an EU summit in Brussels a day later, the story of dashed hopes was eerily similar. At the same June summit in 2022, Ukraine was granted EU candidate status and exactly a year ago the same gathering decided to formally start accession talks.
- This year, the stated goal from both Kyiv and Brussels was to officially open several of the six negotiation clusters needed to become a member. Both the European Commission and 26 of the 27 EU member states believe that Ukraine is ready for this, but there is a need for unanimity to make it happen.
- And so far, Hungary has not played ball. Quite the opposite. In the run-up to the summit, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban presented the results of a consultative referendum in the Central European country in which over 2 million people, or 95 percent of those who cast ballots, had voted against Ukrainian EU membership.
- Going into the meeting he said that “the problem is the war, if we integrate Ukraine, we integrate the war.” When pressed by RFE/RL if he would change his mind if there is a cease-fire, he simply retorted that there isn’t one.
- The fact that draft summit conclusions of just EU-26 had been drawn up in advance shows that the Budapest blockage is taken for granted. The text notes member states invite "the Council to take the next steps in the accession process in line with the merit-based approach, with clusters being opened when the conditions are met. It takes good note of the assessment of the Commission that the fundamentals cluster is ready to be opened. The European Council will revert to this issue at its next meeting.”
- It's symbolic support of Kyiv’s EU integration, but practically it means nothing. It was also indicative that Zelenskyy didn’t show up in person in Brussels, addressing the leaders via videolink instead. EU officials cited “logistical reasons” for his absence, which is curious considering that he managed to be in both The Hague and that he addressed the Council of Europe in Strasbourg the day before.
- While there are hopes that Hungary might give in soon, perhaps even later this summer, most European officials concede that the veto might last all the way up to the Hungarian parliamentary election slated for April 2026 as the issue of Ukrainian EU integration now has crept into the national debate.
- It is also telling that no more EU countries have put bigger pressure on Hungary to give the green light. But there are other things that are more important right now. Take the need to get the country onboard when it comes to agreeing on new Russia sanctions and to roll over those imposed in the last three years, something that happened at the summit.
- But then there is a sense in European capitals that some countries secretly are quite comfortable with slowing down Ukraine’s EU accession. And this goes beyond Hungary and Slovakia, which has expressed reservations on moving forward too quickly.
- Poland recently elected a new president, Karol Nawrocki, who didn’t shy away from criticizing Ukrainian agricultural imports to the EU or raise thorny historical issues between Warsaw and Kyiv. Czechia might elect a government in the autumn that would be decidedly less enthusiastic about Ukraine in general.
- Ukraine’s most immediate neighbors clearly see that Ukraine will fight for the same EU funds that they are counting on in the coming years. And even further West, there are reservations about being too quick in taking in a big and poor country locked in a bloody conflict with a nuclear superpower.
- The club itself must undergo reforms for such an addition to the family and those reforms are both politically and financially painful. Unlike its NATO bid, Ukraine’s EU membership is not off the table. But this week has shown that the ambitious goal of getting Kyiv in by 2030 might have to be revised. “Let’s just say that the 2030s sounds more feasible now,” as one diplomat put it.
Looking Ahead
EU leaders failed to agree on the latest sanctions package at the summit last week.
Slovakia is still not giving the green light as Bratislava is seeking exemptions from a totally separate European Commission proposal that would force EU member states to totally phase out Russian energy imports within the next two years.
Commission officials will travel to Slovakia on July 3 in order to find a way out from this impasse.
That's all for this week!
Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.
Until next time,
Rikard Jozwiak
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