Wider Europe

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two major issues: Why the EU still can’t agree on new Russia sanctions & Denmark's EU presidency.

Briefing #1: Why Can't The EU Get Its Russia Sanctions Over The Line?

What You Need To Know: The European Union is edging closer to finally adopting its latest sanctions package, the 18th since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine over three years ago. But two items remain to be negotiated. First, there's the price cap on Russian oil. It’s included in the draft proposal seen by RFE/RL, but it's unclear whether it will stay. Second, there's a Slovak veto on an issue that is related to the sanctions, though not directly part of the package.

Deep Background: When the European Commission presented the proposed package to EU member states in early June, its main proposal was to lower the price cap from the current level of $60 to $45 per barrel.

Since the policy is coordinated through the Group of Seven (G7) nations, the EU sought approval from other G7 countries -- notably the United States -- for the change at a summit in Canada last month. But it failed to get the Americans on board, especially as oil prices surged after Israeli and American attacks on Iran.

Brussels has, however, considered going ahead regardless -- especially since the Russian oil price cap was originally a workaround to the EU’s ban on providing services for transporting Russian oil. In recent discussions in Brussels, EU officials who are familiar with the file but not authorized to speak on the record noted that Cyprus, Greece, and Malta -- all countries with considerable maritime services sectors -- are against lowering the price cap.

However, Greece and Cyprus could ease their stance, especially as the United Kingdom, another big maritime insurer, is in agreement with Brussels on a lower oil price cap. Diplomats even think that the United State could eventually join as well if Brussels and London are fully on board. The last hold-out appears to be Malta, even though there are some hopes that Valletta could agree to a cap lower than $60 but above the proposed $45 per barrel.

Drilling Down:

• Then there is the matter of the Slovak veto. Bratislava has conditioned its thumbs up for more Russia sanctions on the reworking of a separate proposal by the European Commission to phase out Russian energy imports into the bloc by the end of 2027.
• The proposal, presented in May, is called “RePowerEU” and has caused consternation in Slovakia as well as Hungary, which is understood to be quietly backing its northern neighbor.
• And it is easy to see why. Since 2022, the European Union has limited various Russian energy exports via sanctions, for example by banning most coal and oil imports into the bloc. But sanctions require unanimity among the 27 EU member states, and Hungary and Slovakia have, in recent years, vetoed some of the more ambitious proposals from Brussels targeting Russian energy.
• The European Commission is therefore attempting, via RePowerEU, to regulate the EU’s internal market with a raft of measures, most of which can be adopted via a qualified majority of 55 percent of the member states representing 65 percent of the total EU population voting in favor. In other words, taking a route that circumvents Bratislava and Budapest.
• The key proposal will be a legal requirement to ban all new Russian gas contracts and short-term “spot” contracts for Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) by the end of this year. For longer-term contracts, the regulation will suggest a phase-out period ending no later than 2027.
• EU gas imports from Russia have decreased from 45 percent in 2021 to 19 percent in 2024, and are expected to fall to 13 percent in 2025 with the end of the Ukraine transit route at the start of the year. The EU has, however, been embarrassed by a 12 percent increase in Russian LNG imports in 2024 compared to 2023.
• With regard to oil imports, the situation is less dramatic but highly geographically specific and politically sensitive. Russian oil imports now account for only three percent of total EU oil imports, compared to 27 percent in 2022, largely due to sanctions banning Russian seaborne oil imports and refined petroleum products.
• But landlocked Central European nations got an exemption from these measures. While the Czech Republic has now stopped importing from this source, Hungary and Slovakia still get 80 percent of their oil imports from Russia.
• The European Commission will now demand an end to Russian oil imports by the end of 2027. Hungary and Slovakia need to provide a timeline on how they plan to achieve this, outline their alternative plans, and provide greater transparency regarding their current contracts with Moscow.
• Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico indicated at the EU summit in Brussels on June 26 that he would not green light the sanctions package, indicating that he needs clarifications regarding RePowerEU. According to diplomats familiar with the file, Bratislava is seeking legal certainty regarding potential Gazprom claims over contracts rather than exemptions.
• Last week, European Commission officials visited Bratislava to meet with Slovak officials and representatives of energy companies. While the meetings “went well” according to EU diplomats, it appears that Fico still isn’t fully on board. EU ambassadors, meeting in Brussels on July 4 to discuss the sanctions, were told he is not ready to approve just yet.
• The press release issued by the Slovak Economy Ministry after the European Commission visit also hinted that more talks are needed in the coming days. Economy Minister Denisa Sakova said that “the Bratislava meeting was an important step towards finding solutions that take into account the specific factors of each member state when diversifying sources and thus ensure affordable energy prices also for Slovak industry, which is facing rising costs.”
• She added that “we are ready to continue to take a constructive approach to the proposed measures and to continue the expert discussion with the involvement of all relevant stakeholders."

Briefing #2: Denmark’s Full Intray For Its EU Presidency

What You Need To Know: Denmark has taken over the six-month rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union as questions swirl over Europe's security, trade, and the war still raging on its eastern flank. While there isn’t much Copenhagen can do about some of the issues that will face the 27-nation bloc given the veto power wielded by some capitals, Denmark is expected to push for the EU to compensate for diminishing aid coming from Washington. Russian and Ukrainian officials met in Istanbul on May 16 and June 2, the first direct peace talks since the initial weeks of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which Moscow launched on February 24, 2022. The negotiations yielded agreements on prisoner swaps and the exchange of bodies of soldiers killed in the war, but produced no progress toward a cease-fire, let alone a peace deal. A month later, it seems a peace deal is no closer at hand.

Then there's the transatlantic trade row that risks erupting again as the August 1 deadline set by the Trump administration for a deal on tariffs is approaching swiftly. If no agreement is reached, EU goods going to the US could face 50 percent tariffs. The European Commission is in charge of what have been intense negotiations between Washington and Brussels on a new longer-term deal. Denmark’s role will be in the background, trying to get all member states onboard with whatever the Commission compromises on, which can be tough as some countries are more dependent on trade than others. The same is true for potential trade deals that the Commission can strike later this year with countries such Australia and India. EU countries need to sign off on these deals, but expect a lot of resistance as protectionism grows among some members with major farming sectors.

Deep Background: And then there's the elephant -- in this case the world's biggest island -- in the corner of the room: Greenland. Denmark wants to avoid any transatlantic dealings in coming months over the island, which is under Danish control but coveted by US President Donald Trump. The topic reportedly wasn't broached at a recent NATO summit in The Hague that Trump attended, and Danish officials hope this remains the case during their country's EU presidency. A recent election result in Greenland has also strengthened Copenhagen’s hand and there could even be renewed calls for the territory, which withdrew from the European Union back in 1985, to be part of the bloc again. For now, Denmark at least has the backing of all other member states when it comes to its territorial integrity, but this issue could resurface again at any time, posing numerous awkward questions in Brussels and beyond. The Danish Prime minister, Mette Frederiksen, mentioned the issue in her joint presser with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen when marking the opening of the presidency: “For many people in Greenland and the entire kingdom of Denmark, it feels safe when you really can feel that the rest of Europe stands together with you in this strange and difficult situation.”

Drilling Down:

• Another issue that will dominate Denmark's presidency is the EU’s new long-term budget beginning in 2028.
• The European Commission will fire the opening salvo in mid-July by presenting a basic framework for the five-year period and then come back in September with a more developed concept.
• Don’t expect a deal any time soon.
• The long-term EU budget, which will be a pot of money well north of 1 trillion euros, is the most fought-over issue lingering over Brussels.
• It will consume the city and pit institutions and member states against each other for months, even years, to come. Denmark will simply make sure that talks don’t boil over from the get-go.
• What about EU foreign policy and enlargement? On foreign policy, the bloc's top diplomat will help guide potential sanctions on Georgia, which has been criticized for backsliding on democratic reforms and lurching away from Brussels and toward Moscow.
• But with Hungary and Slovakia expected to veto any tough measures, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas will have a tough time brokering a deal with teeth.
• The same is likely to be true of future sanctions on Russia even though the club’s 18th round is expected to be agreed in the coming days, though likely without the signature move to lower the Russian oil cap from the current $60 per barrel to $45 after the idea failed to gain support from Washington.
• While Denmark is keen to accelerate EU enlargement and has made it a priority during the next six months, various national vetoes are likely to make progress minimal.
• Poland, which held the presidency before Denmark, had big hopes here but ended up with Albania opening some negotiation chapters and Montenegro closing one.
• Expect that these two Western Balkan states will continue their steady march toward membership in the coming half a year, but otherwise Denmark will likely face the same frustrations as Warsaw.
• Hungary continues to block Ukraine from opening accession talks, and there is real fear among EU officials that Budapest will continue to do so until its parliamentary election in April 2026.
• The tricky question for Denmark will be whether it attempts to decouple Moldova from Ukraine, as they so far have progressed hand in hand. If it happens, it is likely to be in September, just ahead of crucial Moldovan parliamentary elections later that month.
• Hungary’s behavior will make calls for the country to be stripped of its voting rights grow, but to do that unanimity is needed, and Slovakia -- and possibly others -- are unlikely to give that a green light.
• Backlash to that could come from other countries in the form of reluctance to give the go-ahead to open and close accession chapters with “Hungarian favorites” such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, while North Macedonia, already blocked by a Bulgarian veto for two years, will wonder why no one is putting pressure on Sofia.
• Kosovo, which applied to join the EU in 2022, will presumably also see its bid to join club continue to languish in the Council.
• Denmark would like to send the application for a European Commission assessment, but there is no consensus among member states, and Copenhagen’s case is not helped by Pristina’s inability to form a government months after a general election.

Looking Ahead

Thursday, July 10, will see two important meetings related to Ukraine happening in Rome.

Firstly, the so-called “coalition of the willing” are meeting chaired by the British Prime minister Keir Starmer. The informal group of largely European countries, brought together by France and Britain, will continue to discuss how to the continent can step up and support Kyiv in case there is a ceasefire.

The Italian capital will also host a “recovery conference” for Ukraine hosted by the Italian Premier Giorgia Meloni. This annual conference is meant to gather financial and practical support for the reconstruction of the war-torn country. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy will attend both meetings.

That's all for this week!

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two major issues: potential Georgia sanctions and Ukraine’s setback on EU and NATO membership.

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Wider Europe Briefing: Georgia Risks EU Sanctions; Ukraine Hits Roadblocks In NATO, EU Bids

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Briefing #1: Is The EU Now Ready To Sanction Georgia?

What You Need To Know: After months of simmering tensions in the country, Georgia is slowly moving up the EU’s agenda again, driven by a wave of arrests of opposition figures and new restrictive laws such as the Foreign Agent Registration Act and changes to broadcasting regulations.

For much of the past year, the EU has struggled to form a clear strategy toward the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) government, particularly after it claimed victory in last year’s disputed parliamentary elections amid allegations of irregularities.

Earlier this year, Brussels imposed visa requirements on holders of Georgian diplomatic passports and refrained from holding high-level meetings while attempting to divert some funding away from the government and toward civil society instead.

However, stronger measures -- like EU sanctions on GD leaders -- were blocked, especially by Hungary and Slovakia, in early 2025.

Deep Background: Could things be different now?

EU foreign ministers briefly discussed the situation in Georgia when they assembled in Brussels on June 23 and they agreed to come back to the issue again when they meet on July 15 ahead of the monthlong Brussels recess when little of note occurs in terms of policymaking in the bloc.

Prompting the recent June discussion was a one-page paper drafted by Lithuania, one of the EU’s more hawkish voices regarding Georgia’s current leadership.

Seen by RFE/RL, it proposes several measures that the club can enact as the situation in Georgia continues “to deteriorate drastically.”

While the discussion was rather short and came at the end of the meeting, several member states spoke out and seemed to agree that Brussels needs to do something more.

However, EU officials whom RFE/RL has spoken to under condition of anonymity did suggest it was very telling that Hungary argued that the bloc should pursue closer cooperation with Tbilisi.

Austria, while critical of the situation in the South Caucasus republic, also cautioned that it was important not to push it too much into Russia’s orbit.

Drilling Down

• So, what is Lithuania proposing? One of the six points is, of course, personal sanctions on Georgian Dream’s leadership. This will not fly due to Budapest’s objections, but EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas interestingly floated another sanctions idea when speaking to media after the meeting: to target judges that are responsible for sentencing the opposition and civil society members.
• While it’s hard to envisage unanimity on this, it should be noted that EU sanctions on Russia and Belarus several years ago started with asset freezes and visa bans on lower-profile people, such as judges, instead of well-known political players.
• Other suggestions in the paper allude to suspending all EU financial aid to Tbilisi, including “large-scale infrastructure projects.” These sorts of investments are often hard to just stop, however, especially since other countries in the region could be involved and the projects are already under way.
• Brussels is also exploring channeling more money to independent journalists, civil society groups, and dismissed Georgian diplomats and civil servants. But the reality is that the EU is trying to help a lot of organizations and countries worldwide in recent months after USAID scaled down its operations. The bloc will start discussions this summer on a new long-term budget beyond the current one, which runs out in 2027. But, right now, there isn’t too much spare cash available.
• Perhaps the two most interesting topics covered in the discussion paper are the suspension of visa liberalization and of the EU-Georgia association agreement. None of this will be easy to do, but there are a few things worth looking out for here.
• Removing visa liberalization for all Georgian citizens is something few want as it targets the general population. But the paper has floated the idea of setting a concrete deadline for Tbilisi to address shortcomings, notably around fundamental rights, as highlighted in a 2024 European Commission report on visa policies for third countries.
• It could be that visa suspension for certain categories of travelers could be forthcoming, especially since this only requires a qualified majority of member states (55 percent of countries representing 65 percent of the total EU population). The EU itself has also enacted rules making it easier to issue suspensions.
• Then there is the EU-Georgia association agreement, which has been in force since 2016. This regulates political and trade relations between Brussels and Tbilisi via the so-called Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area agreement (DCFTA), which is part of the general association agreement.
• The Lithuanian paper suggests the European Commission should examine whether Georgia is breaching the agreement, particularly Article 2, which covers fundamental principles like respect for human rights. A similar review was recently conducted on the EU-Israel association agreement, and Brussels found several breaches. Given this emerging trend in EU foreign policy, don’t be surprised if some member states push for a Georgia review as soon as July.
• Further down the line it is worth noting that unanimity is needed to suspend the entire association agreement, but suspending some areas could be easier. To put the trade aspects of the agreement on ice, for example, only requires a qualified majority.

Briefing #2: Ukraine's Difficult Week At The EU And NATO

What You Need To Know: Last week could have been a momentous week in Ukraine’s long-term wish of joining the European Union and NATO.

In the end, it wasn't.

As leaders of the two institutions met for key summits in Brussels and The Hague respectively, Kyiv’s eventual membership of both should have been a centerpiece.

Instead, Ukraine is no closer to joining either -- and the many obstacles in the war-torn country's path to the Euro-Atlantic community were on full display.

Rewind one year to NATO’s Washington summit.

Just like in Vilnius a year ago, Ukraine was frustrated that it didn’t get an invitation, but the final declaration gushed about the country.

“We fully support Ukraine’s right to choose its own security arrangements and decide its own future, free from outside interference. Ukraine’s future is in NATO,” the text reaffirmed, before adding “as Ukraine continues this vital work, we will continue to support it on its irreversible path to full Euro-Atlantic integration, including NATO membership.”

Joe Biden, the US president at the time, was reluctant to go further, with Kyiv engaged in direct conflict with Russia.

Germany was quietly backing Washington’s stance but the warm language and “the guest of honor” treatment of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the summit was indicative of an aspirant country that soon would transform to a full-fledged ally.

Deep Background: At this year’s NATO summit in The Hague, the scenes could not have been much starker.

Biden is no longer president. In his place is Donald Trump, who has openly dismissed Ukraine’s chances of joining for years.

And the new reality was on display everywhere.

There was no NATO-Ukraine Council on a leaders’ level. No one talked openly about Ukraine’s eventual membership and there were no words about it in the final declaration.

Instead, there was just a line that allies can count financial support to Kyiv as part of the military alliance’s new defense spending target.

Granted, Zelenskyy was present at the summit dinner. He met all relevant leaders, including a bilateral with Donald Trump that according to all read-outs went well.

Trump even said he was nice, opened up for potential Patriot deliveries to Ukraine, and seemed to show willingness to press Russian President Vladimir Putin to come to the table.

But, in reality, Ukraine got nothing concrete, niceties aside.

Washington is still reluctant to sanction Russia, the Europeans are shying away from their signature proposal to lower the Russian oil price cap, and when it comes to NATO membership, Kyiv is further away now than it was a year ago.

The fact that officials said it was a success that Trump didn’t treat Zelenskyy badly and that the Ukrainians didn’t complain about the lack of outcomes shows how low expectations were.

Drilling Down

• At an EU summit in Brussels a day later, the story of dashed hopes was eerily similar. At the same June summit in 2022, Ukraine was granted EU candidate status and exactly a year ago the same gathering decided to formally start accession talks.
• This year, the stated goal from both Kyiv and Brussels was to officially open several of the six negotiation clusters needed to become a member. Both the European Commission and 26 of the 27 EU member states believe that Ukraine is ready for this, but there is a need for unanimity to make it happen.
• And so far, Hungary has not played ball. Quite the opposite. In the run-up to the summit, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban presented the results of a consultative referendum in the Central European country in which over 2 million people, or 95 percent of those who cast ballots, had voted against Ukrainian EU membership.
• Going into the meeting he said that “the problem is the war, if we integrate Ukraine, we integrate the war.” When pressed by RFE/RL if he would change his mind if there is a cease-fire, he simply retorted that there isn’t one.
• The fact that draft summit conclusions of just EU-26 had been drawn up in advance shows that the Budapest blockage is taken for granted. The text notes member states invite "the Council to take the next steps in the accession process in line with the merit-based approach, with clusters being opened when the conditions are met. It takes good note of the assessment of the Commission that the fundamentals cluster is ready to be opened. The European Council will revert to this issue at its next meeting.”
• It's symbolic support of Kyiv’s EU integration, but practically it means nothing. It was also indicative that Zelenskyy didn’t show up in person in Brussels, addressing the leaders via videolink instead. EU officials cited “logistical reasons” for his absence, which is curious considering that he managed to be in both The Hague and that he addressed the Council of Europe in Strasbourg the day before.
• While there are hopes that Hungary might give in soon, perhaps even later this summer, most European officials concede that the veto might last all the way up to the Hungarian parliamentary election slated for April 2026 as the issue of Ukrainian EU integration now has crept into the national debate.
• It is also telling that no more EU countries have put bigger pressure on Hungary to give the green light. But there are other things that are more important right now. Take the need to get the country onboard when it comes to agreeing on new Russia sanctions and to roll over those imposed in the last three years, something that happened at the summit.
• But then there is a sense in European capitals that some countries secretly are quite comfortable with slowing down Ukraine’s EU accession. And this goes beyond Hungary and Slovakia, which has expressed reservations on moving forward too quickly.
• Poland recently elected a new president, Karol Nawrocki, who didn’t shy away from criticizing Ukrainian agricultural imports to the EU or raise thorny historical issues between Warsaw and Kyiv. Czechia might elect a government in the autumn that would be decidedly less enthusiastic about Ukraine in general.
• Ukraine’s most immediate neighbors clearly see that Ukraine will fight for the same EU funds that they are counting on in the coming years. And even further West, there are reservations about being too quick in taking in a big and poor country locked in a bloody conflict with a nuclear superpower.
• The club itself must undergo reforms for such an addition to the family and those reforms are both politically and financially painful. Unlike its NATO bid, Ukraine’s EU membership is not off the table. But this week has shown that the ambitious goal of getting Kyiv in by 2030 might have to be revised. “Let’s just say that the 2030s sounds more feasible now,” as one diplomat put it.

Looking Ahead

EU leaders failed to agree on the latest sanctions package at the summit last week.

Slovakia is still not giving the green light as Bratislava is seeking exemptions from a totally separate European Commission proposal that would force EU member states to totally phase out Russian energy imports within the next two years.

Commission officials will travel to Slovakia on July 3 in order to find a way out from this impasse.

That's all for this week!

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.